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Appendix 1 
 
Second Army Infantry Orders of Battle 
Divisions: II Corps & VIII Corps 
November/December 1917 
1
 
 
 
   
1
st 
Division (Regular): Major-General E.P. Strickland 
 
1
st
 Brigade: Brigadier-General C.J.C. Grant 
 
1
st
 Black Watch            1
st
 Cameron Highlanders 
 
10
th
 Gloucester Regiment                      8
th
 Royal Berkshire Regiment 
 
 
2
nd
 Brigade: Brigadier-General G.C. Kemp 
 
2
nd
 Royal Sussex Regiment                      1
st
 LNL 
 
1
st
 Northamptonshire Regiment          2
nd
 KRRC 
 
 
3
rd
 Brigade: Brigadier-General R.C.A. McCalmont 
 
1
st
 South Wales Borderers           1
st
 Gloucestershire Regiment 
 
2
nd
 Welsh Regiment            2
nd
 Royal Munster Fusiliers 
 
Pioneers: 6
th
 Welsh Regiment 
 
 
 
8
th
 Division (Regular): Major-General W.C.G. Heneker  
 
23
rd
 Brigade: Brigadier-General G.W. St. G. Grogan 
 
2
nd
 Devonshire Regiment           2
nd
 West Yorkshire Regiment 
 
2
nd
 Cameronians            2
nd
 Middlesex Regiment 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 As relevant to the narrative.  
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24
th
 Brigade: Lieutenant-Colonel H.R.C Stirling (Acting GOC 7 to 21 November) 
           Brigadier-General R. Haig (from 21 November) 
 
1
st
 Worcestershire Regiment            2
nd
 East Lancashire Regiment 
 
1
st
 Sherwood Foresters            2
nd
 Northamptonshire Regiment 
 
 
25
th
 Brigade: Brigadier-General C. Coffin VC 
 
2
nd
 Lincolnshire Regiment            2
nd
 Royal Berkshire Regiment 
 
1
st
 Royal Irish Rifles             2
nd
 Rifle Brigade 
 
Pioneers: 22
nd
 DLI 
 
 
 
14
th 
(Light) Division (New Army): Major-General V.A. Couper 
 
 41
st
 Brigade: Brigadier-General P.C.B. Skinner 
 
7
th
 KRRC               7
th
 Rifle Brigade 
 
8
th
 KRRC               8
th
 Rifle Brigade 
 
 
42
nd
 Brigade: Brigadier-General G.N.B. Forster 
 
5
th
 Oxford & Bucks Light Infantry            5
th
 KSLI 
 
9
th
 KRRC               9
th
 Rifle Brigade 
 
 
43
rd
 Brigade: Brigadier-General R.S. Tempest 
 
6
th
 Somerset Light Infantry              6
th
 DCLI 
 
6
th
 KOYI                10
th
 DLI 
 
Pioneers: 11
th
 King‟s (Liverpool Regiment) 
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32
nd
 Division (New Army): Major-General C.D. Shute 
 
14
th
 Brigade: Brigadier-General F.W. Lumsden VC  
 
5/6
th
 Royal Scots                  1
st
 Dorsetshire Regiment 
 
2
nd
 Manchester Regiment                 15
th
 HLI 
 
 
 96
th
 Brigade: Brigadier-General A.C. Girdwood 
 
 2
nd
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers                15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers 
 
16
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers                 16
th
 Northumberland Fusiliers 
 
 
97
th
 Brigade: Brigadier-General C. A. Blacklock 
 
2
nd
 KOYLI                   11
th
 Border Regiment 
 
16
th
 HLI                   17
th
 HLI 
 
Pioneers: 17
th
 Northumberland Fusiliers
2
 
 
 
 
33
rd
 Division (New Army): Major-General P.R. Wood (to 28 November) 
            Major-General R.J. Pinney (from 28 November) 
        
19
th
 Brigade: Brigadier-General C.R.G. Mayne 
 
2
nd
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers                           20
th
 Royal Fusiliers 
 
1
st
 Cameronians                             5/6
th
 Cameronians 
 
 
98
th
 Brigade: Brigadier-General J.D. Heriot-Maitland 
 
1/4
th
 King‟s (Liverpool Regiment)               1/4th Suffolk Regiment   
 
1
st
 Middlesex Regiment                2
nd
 A&SH  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Re-assigned GHQ Railway Construction troops on 15 November 1917.  
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100
th
 Brigade: Brigadier-General A.W.F. Baird 
 
1
st
 Queens (Royal West Surrey) Regiment             2
nd
 Worcestershire Regiment 
 
16
th
 KRRC             1/9
th
 HLI 
 
Pioneers: 18
th
 Middlesex Regiment 
 
 
 
35
th 
(Bantam) Division (New Army): Major-General G. Franks 
 
104
th
 Brigade: Brigadier-General A.W. Sandilands 
 
17
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers            18
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers 
 
20
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers            23
rd
 Manchester Regiment 
 
 
105
th
 Brigade: Brigadier-General A.H. Marindin 
 
15
th
 Cheshire Regiment            16
th
 Cheshire Regiment 
 
14
th
 Gloucestershire Regiment           15
th
 Sherwood Foresters 
 
 
106
th
 Brigade: Brigadier-General J.H.W. Pollard 
 
17
th
 Royal Scots             18
th
 HLI 
 
19
th
 DLI                                                                    4
th
 North Staffordshire Regiment
3
 
 
Pioneers: 19
th
 Northumberland Fusiliers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
                                                 
3
 Replaced 17
th
 West Yorkshire on 15 November 1917. 
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Appendix 2 
 
      Infantry Orders of Battle: 25th Division & 38th Division 
           
 
                                            25
th
 Division: 49
th
 Infanterie-Brigade 
 
         Leibgarde Infanterie-Regiment (1.Grossherzoglich  Hessisches) Nr. 115 
 
               Infanterie-Regiment Kaiser Wilhelm (2.Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 116 
         
                           Infanterie-Leibregiment (3.Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117  
 
 
                                           38
th
 Division: 83
rd
 Infanterie-Brigade  
 
       Infanterie-Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) Nr. 94 
   
                  6. Thüringisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 95   
 
                  7. Thüringisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 96
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Appendix 3 
                  (a) 
 
           Copy No. ___ 
 
                                           Second Army Order No. 14 4 
 
            Reference: Attack map attached
5
 
 
1. The offensive (Tenth Phase) will be resumed by the Second Army on “X” day at 
an hour that will be notified later.  
 
2. The operation will be carried out by the II and VIII corps. The objective of each 
corps is shown in RED on the attached map.  
 
3. For the purpose of this operation, the boundary between the II Corps and VIII 
Corps will be shown in BROWN on attached map. The II Corps will take over 
from the VIII Corps up to this boundary as soon as possible after the minor 
operations mentioned in para. 4 have taken place. 
 
4. As a preliminary to the operation laid down for “X” day, the VIII Corps will 
capture the enemy‟s posts situated on HILL 52 (V. 30. a) in conjunction with II 
Corps, who will at the same time capture VOX FARM (V. 30. a. 00. 75.). These 
minor operations will be undertaken as soon as possible, the date and details being 
arranged by the corps concerned. 
 
5. (a) The artillery policy to be pursued previous to the attack on “X” day will be 
carried out in accordance with Artillery Instructions No. 28 already issued to all 
concerned.  
 
(b) Details of the artillery for “X” day will be issued later, 
 
6. The Army Report Centre will be at Locre Chateau. 
 
7. Acknowledge by wire. 
 
 
??? Lt. Col. 
                                                                                                for Major-General, 
                                                                                                General Staff 
                                                                                                Second Army 
 H.Q., Second Army                                                               Issued at 1:30 p.m.   
 21
st
 November, 1917                                                                
                                                 
4
 TNA WO/158/209: Second Army Operations Files.  
5
 See Map 4.   
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                                                                                                                      (b)                                                          
 
SECRET                                                                                                          Copy No. 1 
 
                    Amendment to Second Army Operation Order No. 14 6 
 
1. Para. 4 is cancelled 
 
2. Reference para. 3. The II Corps will take over from the VIII Corps up to the 
boundary shown on map issued with above order, on night of 24/25
th
 November. 
 
3. Acknowledge by wire.  
 
HQ Second Army                                                           ??? Lt. Col 
            22
nd
 November 1917                                                       for General Staff 
                                                                                                     Second Army 
             
           Issued at 11-30 p.m. 
           Copies to recipients of Order No. 14.  
 
             
                              (c) 
 
SECRET                                                                                               Copy No. 1 
                                                                                                     Second Army No. 1/2 (G).       
 
                                Reference Second Army Order No. 14 7 
 
The operation of the II and VIII Corps will be carried out on night of D/E [1/2 December] 
day an hour to be notified later.  
 
Acknowledge by wire 
 
H.Q., Second Army                                                                        ??? Lt. Col.                                           
25 November 1917                                                                         for General Staff 
                                                                                             Second Army          
 
Issued at 11:00 p.m.  
 
Copies to recipients of Order No. 14. 
                                                 
6
 TNA WO/158/209: Second Army Operations Files.  
7
 Ibid. 
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Appendix 4 
                                                                                                        (a) 
 
                                                                                                          SECRET  
                                                                                                                   Copy No. 23 
 
  21 November 1917 
 
            VIII Corps Order No. 52 8 
 
1. The offensive will be resumed by the VIII Corps in cooperation with II Corps at a 
date [,] which has been communicated to all concerned. Zero hour will be notified 
later. 
 
2. The operation will be carried out by the 8th Division (VIII Corps) and the 32nd 
Division (II Corps). The main objective of each division is shown in RED on the 
attached map. 
 
3. The machine-gun companies of 14th, 33rd, and 39th divisions will cooperate under 
orders to be issued later. 
 
4. For the purpose of this operation the boundary between II Corps and VIII Corps 
will be shown in Brown on attached map. The II Corps are arranging to take the 
frontline up to this boundary from the VIII Corps on the night following the minor 
operation mentioned in the next paragraph. 
 
5. As a preliminary to the main operation [,] the 8th Division, in cooperation with 
32
nd
 Division, will carry out a minor operation in square V. 30. a. with a view to 
reaching such a line as will deny to the enemy any observation of the forming up 
places in that square [,] which are to be used by the 32
nd
 Division. Details of this 
operation, which will take place as soon as possible after the night of 23
rd
/24
th
 
November, will be arranged between divisions concerned and reported to corps 
headquarters.  
 
6. (a) The artillery policy to be pursued previous to the main attack will be carried 
out in accordance with VIII Corps Artillery Instructions of today‟s date. 
 
            (b) Details of the artillery programme of the main attack will be issued later.  
 
 
      7. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE                                                C. F. Aspinall 
                                                                                                            BGGS 
                                                                                                            VIII Corps 
          Issued to Signals at midnight.                   
                                                 
8
 BL: VIII Corps War Diary, Hunter-Weston Papers, 48359, Vol. V. 
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                                                                                                                                          (b) 
                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                      SECRET 
                                                                                                                    Copy No. 22 
 
                                                                                                              23
rd
 November 1917 
                 
VIII Corps Order No. 54 9 
 
1. The minor operation referred to in para. 5 of VIII Corps Order No. 52, is 
cancelled. 
 
2. Para. 3 of VIII Corps Order No. 52 is cancelled. The machine-gun companies of 
33
rd
 Division will give such assistance to the attack of 8
th
 Division as the G.O.C. 
8
th
 Division may require.  
 
3. The temporary boundary between VIII and II Corps for the purpose of this 
operation, as shown on the map issued with VIII Corps Order No, 52, will be 
amended north-east of TEALL COTTAGE and will be a straight line drawn from 
Teall Cottage (inclusive to VIII Corps), to the RACKET WOOD, W. 19. a.  
 
4. The II Corps will take over the front up to this boundary from the VIII Corps on 
the night of 24/25
th
 November. Any minor adjustment of the inter-divisional 
boundary between 8
th
 Division and 33
rd
 Division will be adjusted on or after the 
night 24/25
th
 November, under arrangements between divisions concerned. The 
date on which this adjustment will be made will be reported to Corps 
headquarters.  
 
5. By arrangement with the II Corps and VIII Corps will retain the following 
accommodation on MEETCHEELE Spur after that spur has been handed over to 
II Corps: -  
 
        1 Battalion H.Q. at MEETCHEELE 
        1 Battalion H.Q. & Aid Post at MOSSELMARKT  
                                            1 Brigade H.Q. on BELLEVUE Spur 
 
      The VIII Corps will also have use of the BELLEVUE - MEETCHEELE  ROAD 
for pack transport, except between dusk and zero on the night of the attack: also 
the exclusive use  of the two new tracks south of MEETCHEELE. 
 
6. ACKOWLEDGE 
                                                                                                    V.A. Jackson Major 
                                                                                                    for  BGGS VIII Corps 
            Issued to Signals at 4:30 p.m.
                                                 
9
 Ibid.  
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Appendix 5 
 
                              (a) 
 
 
         SECRET. 
                 Copy No. 6 
          II Corp Headquarters 
          22
nd
 November 1917 
 
 
   II Corps Operation Order No. 167.10 
 
 
Reference Map 
Tiendenberg Sheet.  
Scale 1/10,000 
 
1. The Second Army is, with the II and VIII corps, resuming the offensive at an early date 
with a view to capturing the general line VENISON TRENCH (V.30.b.) – VOLT FARM 
(V.24.c.) – MALLET COPSE (V.23.d.) – VEAL COTTAGES (V.23.c.). The day of the 
attack and the hour of zero will be notified later.  
 
2. A summary of information regarding the enemy forces and defences in front of II 
Corps is attached (not reproduced).  
 
3. The II Corps will be on the left of the attack and will, with the 32
nd
 Division, capture 
the approximate line: 
 
V.24.d.6.2 – V.24.c.95.15 – V.24.a.25.00 – V.23.c.8.8 – V.22.d.9.2 – V.28.b.3.2 (see 
attached map; Scale 1/10000.  
 
The 8
th
 Division (VIII Corps) will be attacking on the right of 32
nd
 Division.  
 
4. The boundary line between corps for the operations will be a line drawn from TEALL 
COTTAGE (V.30.b.1.5.) to the SE of RACKET WOOD (W.19.a.1.0.) (see attached 
maps; Scale 1/10000).  
 
5. A definite, distinct and complete unit will be detailed to capture and hold each known 
enemy strongpoint.  
 
6. For the purpose of co-ordination in arranging the barrage tables, the divisional 
artilleries covering the II Corps front will be under the orders of GOCRA II Corps, who 
will issue the necessary instructions and barrage tables.  
                                                 
10
 TNA WO/95/643: II Corps War Diary.  
 14 
 
To each attacking infantry brigade there will be attached a RFA Battery Commander 
whose battery will, when required, be at the direct disposal of the brigadier.  
 
7. Instructions regarding the artillery policy to be pursued previous to the attack are being 
issued separately.  
 
8. II Corps Machine-gun Officer will prepare a machine gun scheme for making the best 
possible use, in co-operation with VIII Corps, of all machine guns available on the front 
of II Corps.  
 
9. GOC 32
nd
 Division will arrange for as many as practicable of the officers of each unit 
to meet (before the day of the attack) the officers of the units that will be operating on its 
flanks.  
 
10. During the operations the usual cross attachment for liaison will be made: and in 
addition arrangements will be made for liaison parties from the right formation of the 
32
nd
 Division to meet similar parties from the 8
th
 Division at fixed points to be agreed 
upon between the division commanders concerned.  
 
11. Instructions are being issued separately as regards communication between infantry 
and aeroplanes, aeroplane to give warning of impending counter-attack, synchronization 
of watches and location of headquarters.  
 
12. 32 Division will forward as early as practicable to II Corps Headquarters a detailed 
scheme showing how it is proposed to carry out the attack.  
 
13. As a preliminary to the above-mentioned operation the VIII Corps is to capture the 
enemy‟s posts situated on HILL 52 (V.30.a.) and in conjunction with this attack the II 
Corps (32
nd
 Division) will capture VOX FARM (V.30.a.05.75). The date for this minor 
operation is being communicated separately.  
 
14. After the capture of the enemy‟s posts on HILL 52 and of VOX FARM the II Corps 
(32
nd
 Division) will temporarily relieve the VIII Corps (8
th
 Division) on the front between 
TEALL COTTAGE (inclusive) (V.30.b.1.5) and VOX FARM (exclusive) (V.30.a.05.75).  
 
Instructions for this relief, which will be carried out as early as practicable after the 
capture of Hill 52, will be issued later.  
 
15. ACKNOWLEDGE. 
 
 
S. H. Wilson 
BGGS 
 
 
Issued at 1:45 p.m.                     
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                                                                                                                                          (b) 
                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                       SECRET. 
                                                                                                                     Copy No. 6 
                   II Corps HQ 
                                                                                                                 22 November 1917 
           
     
 
 II Corps Operation Order No. 168. 11 
 
 
1. Paragraph 13 of II Corps Operation Order No. 167 of the 22 November is cancelled.  
The minor operation therein mentioned will not take place.  
 
2. The jumping-off line for the main operation to be carried out by 32
nd
 Division, will be 
approximately the present front line (shown in BLUE) on the map accompanying II 
Corps Operation Order No. 167).  
 
3. The II Corps (32
nd
 Division) will on the night of 24/25 November relieve the VIII 
Corps  (8
th
 Division) on a front between TEALL COTTAGE (inclusive) (V.30.b.1.5.) and 
VOX FARM  (exclusive) (V.30.a.05.75).  
 
4. All arrangements for relief will be made direct between divisions concerned; and 32
nd
 
Division will inform II Corps of the arrangements made and of the completion of the 
relief. Command will pass at 6:00 a.m. on 25
th
 November.  
 
5. Further instructions will be issued in regards the boundary line between divisions in 
the forward area after the completion of the relief.  
 
6. ACKNOWLEDGE.  
 
 
         S. H. Wilson 
         BGGS 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Issued at 11:55 p.m. 
(Distribution overleaf) 
                                                 
11
 Ibid.  
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Appendix 6 
 
Secret              8
th
 Division No.G.97/1/4. 
 
 
 
          8
th
 Division Instructions No. 1.12 
 
 
1. The offensive will be resumed by VIII and II corps at a date which has been 
communicated to those directly concerned. 
 
2. The operation will be carried out by the 25th Inf. Bde. in co-operation with the 32 
Division (II Corps) on its left. 
 
3. The objective, and the boundary between 8th and 32nd Division, are shown on the 
attached Map G. 31. The boundary line allots tactical responsibility for the 
BELLEVUE SPUR to the 32
nd
 Division. It is understood, however, that certain rights 
such as sites for H.Q‟s. and lines of approach within 32nd Divisional area will be 
allotted to 8
th
 Division. Exact details of these will be notified later. 
 
4. (a) The 32nd Division are arranging to take over from the 8th Division for the purposes 
of this operation, the line as far east as TEALL COTTAGES (inclusive to 8
th
 
Division). This adjustment will take place on the night following the operation 
referred to in para. 5 below.  
 
(b) On the night following this operation, it is probable that 8
th
 Division will take over 
from 33
rd
 Division as far south as the road from D. 6. b. central – E. 1. c. 4. 8. 
inclusive to 8
th
 Division. 
 
5. As soon as possible after night of 23rd/24th November, probably 24th/25th November, 
the 23 Inf. Bde. will, in co-operation with 32
nd
 Division, secure a line V. 30. b. 16 - 
V. 30. a. 7. 7. - V. 30. a. 50. 75 - VOX FARM (exclusive to 8
th
 Division). Details of 
this operation will be notified later.  
 
ACKNOWLEDGE.  
                    
              E. Beddington  
                     Lieut.-Colonel 
                     General Staff 
 
 
22 November 1917.  
                                                 
12
 TNA WO/95/1677: 8
th
 Division War Diary.  
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  Appendix 7 
 
 
 SECRET 
         
                     32
nd
 DIVISION OFFENSIVE INSTRUCTIONS No. 1 
                               OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS 13 
 
             
   21
st
 November 1917 
 
1. Future Operations. The II Corps will continue operations at an early date to drive 
the enemy from the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE. The VIII Corps will operate on 
the right of II Corps.  
 
2. Dividing Lines. The dividing line between the II and VIII corps for the operation 
is shown on the attached map.  
 
3. 1st Phase. The first phase of the operations will be the capture of the RED LINE 
(vide attached map).
14
 
 
4. Task of 32nd Divn. The capture of the RED LINE is the task of 32nd Division. 
The 8
th
 Division, VIII Corps, will attack on the right of the 32
nd
 Division. The 
35
th
 Division will be holding the line on the left of 32
nd
 Division but will not 
assault. 
 
5. Troops to be Employed.  Cancel para 5 and substitute:15 
 
The assault and capture of the RED LINE on the II Corps front has been entrusted 
to the 97
th
 Infantry Brigade with two battalions of the 96
th
 Infantry Brigade 
attached. 
 
The attack will be carried out on a front of five battalions 
                                                 
13
 TNA WO/95/2370: „32nd Division Offensive Instructions No. 1: Outline Plan of Operations‟, 21 
November 1917, 32
nd
 Division War Diary.  
14
 „*Map to 3 Brigades & CRA only‟.  
15
 „32nd Division Instructions No. 1‟ was originally issued on 21 November with the following paragraph: 
„Troops to be Employed. The assault and capture of the RED LINE on II Corps front has been entrusted to 
97
th
 Brigade. The attack will be carried out on a front of four battalions. Definite distinct units will be told 
off to capture garrisons and consolidate each known strongpoint and defended locality. Two battalions of 
either the 96
th
 or 14
th
 (probably 96
th
) Brigade will be holding the line at the time of the attack. Those two 
battalions will come under orders of the G.O.C. 97
th
 Infantry Brigade on Y/Z night at an hour to be notified 
later, and will be available as a reserve and to cover the flanks of the attack and to assist in repelling 
counter-attacks‟. Part 5 was amended on 24 November. See „32nd Div. No. G.S. 1499/15/3 Amendment No. 
1 to 32
nd
 Division Offensive Instructions No. 1‟, 24 November 1917, in TNA WO/95/2370: 32nd Division 
War Diary.  
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One battalion of the 96
th
 Brigade will be held in reserve as a counter-counter-
attacking force on the right flank in the vicinity of VIRILE FARM.  
 
Definite and distinct units will be told off to capture, garrison and consolidate 
each known strongpoint and defended locality.  
 
The two battalions of the 96
th
 Infantry Brigade to take part in the attack will be 
holding the line on the night of the attack.  
 
These two battalions will come under the orders of the G.O.C. 97
th
 Infantry 
Brigade on Y/Z night at an hour to be notified later.  
 
6. General Scheme of Attack. The capture of the RED LINE will be carried out by a 
night attack. The essence of the operation is surprise. In order to fulfill this 
condition the general plan of operation is as follows:  
 
a) The first line of strongpoints (General line V.24.c.2.0.) – 
VOID FARM (inclusive) – VEAL COTTAGES 
(inclusive) at (V.23.c.2.0.) will be rushed at zero hour 
without an artillery or machinegun barrage. 
 
b) At the hour which it is caculated the above line will be 
reached, the artillery will open fire on all known and 
suspected strongpoints and machinegun positions. Lying 
beyond the line mentioned in (a). This barrage will lift as 
the attacking troops form the final objective advance, and 
will be specially thick on the enemy‟s most likely lines of 
counter-attack (i.e. VENISON FARM – VERSE 
COTTAGE – VALUATION HOUSE – MALLET WOOD 
(exclusive) (vide para. 9) ).  
 
c) The exact times at which the artillery will open fire and lift 
off strongpoints will be notified later. This will depend 
upon the orders received from II Corps, the palns of the 
Corps on our right, and the condition of the ground at the 
time of the attack.  
 
7. Probable direction of enemy counter-attack. The most likely direction from 
which a strong enemy counter-attack may be expected is : 
 
a) From the low ground about W.19. central on the south side 
of RACKET WOOD and south of the marshy ground in 
W.24.d.  
 
b) From the low ground about HEIDENGOED COPSE, the 
attack coming from the north side of RACKET WOOD 
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and north of the marshy ground in V.24.d. and thence 
along the ridge via VALUATION HOUSES.  
 
c) A strong enemy attack is not to be expected from the area 
west of MALLET WOOD, as the condition of the ground 
would make such an attack very difficult for the enemy. 
Small local attacks are however to be guarded against in 
this latter area.  
 
8. Probable artillery plan. As soon as the objective is reached the probable artillery  
plan will be: 
 
a) To form a protective barrage in front of the objective, 
which will be very thick on the enemy‟s most likely lines 
of counter-attack (vide para. 6).  
 
b) To search the areas where the enemy is likely to be 
assembling for counter-attack (vide para. 7).  
 
9. Machine-guns. Machine-guns will be organized into:  
 
a) Close defence guns under orders of G.O.C. 97th Brigade. 
These will advance with the troops.  
 
b) Barrage gun under orders of the Corps M.G. Officer.  
 
c) At least two sections, and probably four sections of 
machine-guns will be allotted to the 97
th
 Brigade for close 
defence of the captured line.  
 
d) The number of guns for barrage work is not yet known. 
 
10. The task of these guns will be: 
 
(I) To form a protective barrage in front of the objective in the 
area whence an attack in force may be expected. 
 
(II) To maintain area concentrations on certain areas where the 
enemy is likely to be assembling for counter-attack or over 
which his counter-attacking troops are likely to pass. It is 
important that these selected areas should extend as far 
back as possible. 
 
(III) To keep under fire the defensive localities on the left flank 
of the attack, where snipers and machine-guns may be 
active and which are not included in the objective.  
 20 
 
             Detailed orders for machine-guns will be issued in due course.  
 
11. Consolidation. All localities captured will be consolidated and all available   
machine and Lewis guns pushed up for the defence of the captured ground, the 
majority being advanced to the final objective.  
 
Strongpoints will be constructed in the vicinity of Hill 52 – VOID FARM – 
VOLT FARM – MALLET COPSE – VEAL COTTAGES and enclosures at 
V.22.d.9.2. R.E. and Pioneers will be detailed for this duty. The number available 
will be notified later.  
 
12. Routes. On the night of the attack the four assaulting battalions of the 97th 
brigade will move forward to the assembly position from WURST FARM (1 
battalion), IRISH FARM (2 battalions), HILL TOP (1 battalion).  
 
The routes at present available are MOUSE TRAP TRACK, No. 3 TRACK and 
the GRAVENSTAFEL Road.  
 
It is hoped to get a fourth route constructed by the night of the attack, but this can 
not be relied on, as it must depend on the labour available.  
 
It is essential that the times taken by units to get to our frontline from these 
camps should be known as accurately as possible. All brigades carrying out 
reliefs in the line prior to the attack will have the time taken by battalions to 
reach the frontline from the camps carefully checked, and report on the following 
morning to Divisional Headquarters.  
 
13. Information as to the enemy‟s defences and dispositions was issued under 32nd 
Division No. G.I. 613.1/1 of 20
th
 inst. (Issued only to three brigades, C.R.A. & 
219
th
 M.G. Coy.).  
 
14. Headquarters.  
 
a) Brigade and Battalion headquarters will be selected by by 
the G.O.C. 97
th
 Infantry Brigade after necessary 
reconnaissance. The advanced headquarters of the 97
th
 
Brigade will be in the neighbourhood of KRONPRINZ 
FARM and of the 14
th
 Brigade at KANSAS. The Divsional 
Signal Officer will ensure that the buried cable reaches 
both these points. 
 
b) Divisional headquarters will be at the CANAL BANK 
C.25.d.0.0.  
 
15. Detalied instructions will be issued later. 
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16. G.O.C. 97th Brigade will submit his plans based on these instructions as soon as 
possible.  
 
17. ACKNOWLEDGE                                                               
 
 
        A. E. McNamara 
 
                                                                                                         Lieut-Colonel 
                                                                                                       General Staff 
                                                                                                       32
nd
 Division 
 
 
Issued to: 
 
14
th
 Infantry Brigade 
96
th
 Infantry Brigade 
97
th
 Infantry Brigade 
C.R.A., 32
nd
 Division 
C.R.E., 32
nd
 Division 
A & Q.  
32
nd
 Divl. Signal Coy. 
A.D.M.S. 
D.M.G.O. 
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Appendix 8 
 
 
   32
nd
 Division Instructions No. 11 
         
        32
nd
 Divn. No. G.S. 1499/15/22 
 
SPECIAL INSRUCTIONS TO G.O.C. BRIGADE IN DIVISIONAL SUPPORT 
[14
th
 Infantry Brigade] and G.O.C. BRIGADE IN DIVISIONAL RESERVE (96
th
 
Infantry Brigade).
16
  
 
A. Instructions to G.O.C. 14
th
 Infantry Brigade 
 
1. You will be in command of the brigade in divisional support (14th Infantry 
Brigade, less 14
th
 Machine-gun Company on barrage fire work) during 
forthcoming operations.  
 
2. Your Brigade will be disposed at Zero as under: 
 
Adv. Brigade HQ. – KANSAS  
No. 1 Battalion – BELLEVUE 
No. 2 Battalion – WURST FARM 
No. 3 Battalion – HILL TOP 
No. 4 Battalion – IRISH FARM 
 
14 T.M. Battery (less 4 guns) – BELLEVUE 
2 guns – MEETCHEELE RIDGE 
2 guns – In vicinity of YETTA HOUSES 
 
3. The Divisional Commander does not wish to employ your Brigade in these 
operations unless the enemy should make such a determined counter-attack as to 
endanger our present line.  
 
4. You will be responsible for the defence of the BELLEVUE RIDGE and 
MEETCHEELE RIDGE. Stokes Mortars will be established in defensive 
positions for this purpose. Dumps of 50 rounds of ammunition for each gun must 
be established with each gun.  
 
5. Your battalions will be ready to move at a notice of ¼ hour from Zero onwards. 
The men should, however, get as much rest as possible.  
 
6. In the event of your Battalion at BELLEVUE being ordered forward, you will at 
once replace it by the Battalion at WURST FARM, and replace this latter 
Battalion by the Battalion at HILL TOP.  
                                                 
16
 TNA:WO/95/2370: 32
nd
 Division War Diary.  
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7. You will keep in close touch with the general situation and with the 97th Infantry 
Brigade, and have a liaison officer at the 97
th
 Brigade Headquarters. You should 
establish Brigade O.Ps. in the vicinity of BELLEVUE RIDGE and send frequent 
reports to Divisional Headquarters as to your view of the situation and all which 
comes to your knowledge. The Divisional Commander does not consider it 
necessary for you personally to go in front of the position of your Battalion at 
BELLEVUE.  
 
8. Special instructions are attached (App. A) as to action of the two Stokes Mortars 
at YETTA HOUSES.
17
  
 
9. The 14th Infantry Brigade will probably relieve the 97th Infantry Brigade in the 
line on the night of December 3/4
th
, but must be prepared to do so earlier if 
required.  
 
10. All unit of the 14th Infantry Brigade moving forward must be supplied with 170 
rounds of S.A.A. and 2 days rations.  
 
11. In case of Brigadier General Blacklock D.S.O becoming a casualty you will be 
prepared to assume command of the operations.  
 
 
B. Instructions to G.O.C. 96
th
 Infantry Brigade 
 
1. Your Brigade (less two battalions and machine-gun company) will be in 
divisional reserve during operations. Your Brigade at Zero will be disposed 
as: 
 
Bde. HQ. – CANAL BANK 
No. 1 Battalion – Attached 97th Infantry Brigade 
No. 2 Battalion – Attached 97th Infantry Brigade 
No. 3 Battalion – CANAL BANK 
No. 4 Battalion – IRISH FARM 
 
96
th
 M.G. Coy. – Barrage fire/work  
96
th
 T.M. Battery – IRISH FARM  
 
2. The units under your command will be ready to move at a maximum notice of 
2 hours from Zero onwards.  
 
3. ACKNOWLEDGE                                                        A. E. McNamara 
 
         Lieutenant-Colonel 
                 General Staff 
       30/11/17               32
nd
 Division           
                                                 
17
 See below.  
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Appendix „A‟ Issued with 32nd Division Instructions No. 11  
 
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS for the employment of TWO STOKES MORTARS of 
14
th
 Infantry Brigade
18
 
 
1. It is possible that during the attack of the 97th Infantry Brigade, and after it has 
reached its objective that trouble will be experienced from snipers and machine-
guns west of TOURNANT FARM, and from strongpoints about V.28.a.9.9. The 
enemy‟s battalion in the area V.22.c. and V.28.a. might also endeavour to 
counter-attack in spite of the condition of the ground.  
 
2. To assist in meeting this eventuality, the 14th Infantry Brigade will place two 
Stokes Mortars and 50 rounds per gun at YETTA HOUSES by Zero. At Zero plus 
two hours the guns will move forward to the vicinity of TOURNANT FARM and 
the O.C. will report to the O.C. No. 5 Battalion [15
th
 LF] of attacking force at his 
HQ at the pillbox at V.28.c.7.8.  
 
3. The OC No. 5 Battalion will employ these guns if required: 
 
a) To open a bombardment on any strongpoint, which 
is worrying the infantry. The strongpoint will be 
captured under cover of this bombardment and the 
objective extended to the left.  
 
b) To repel any counter-attack in force.  
 
4. Care will be taken by 14th Infantry Brigade that the movement of these guns to 
YETTA HOUSES will not meet or cross the march of the 97
th
 Infantry Brigade to 
its assembly position. Instructions to this effect have already been issued to the 
GOC 14
th
 Infantry Brigade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 TNA: WO/95/2370: 32
nd
 Division War Diary.  
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Appendix 9 
 
 
      Secret              Copy No. 5 
 
              Headquarters 
              100
th
 Infantry Bde 
  
              1
st 
December 1917 
 
 
   100
th
 Infantry Brigade Order No. 293 19 
 
1. The [8th] Division on our left is carrying out offensive operations tonight as 
explained verbally by the Brigadier General to commanding officers concerned. 
 
2. The operation will be supported by artillery barrage and MG barrage commencing 
at Zero + 8. 
 
3. At Zero + 8 an artillery barrage will be put down on the front of the 100th Infantry 
Bde and will be continued southward – Prior to Zero + 8 normal artillery fire will 
be carried out.  
 
4. OC 16th KRRC will arrange for touch to be maintained with the 2nd Royal 
Berks[hire] Reg[imen]t on the left and will be ready to assist with supporting fire 
in the event of an enemy counter-attack. Special attention must be paid to the 
security of our left flank and front during the operations and until the chance of an 
enemy counter-attack has ceased. Headquarters 2
nd
 Royal Berkshires will be at 
V.30.d.4.2.  
 
5. The 2nd Worcestershire Reg[iment]t will similarly be ready to deal with an enemy 
counter-attack should one develop on our front during the operations.  
 
6. All movement in our area is to be restricted to a minimum from Zero – 1 hour till 
the situation quiets down.  
 
7. The hour of Zero will be notified later. 
 
8. Acknowledge 
 
G.O. Pillean [?] Lieut.  
A/Bde Major  
100
th
 Inf. Bde.  
Issued through Signals at 7.0 a.m. 
                                                 
19
 TNA WO/95/2429: 100
th
 Brigade War Diary.  
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Appendix 10 
 
 
                              97
th
 Brigade Operation Order No. 18120 
 
 
1. PRISM [97 Brigade] will establish itself on the line TEALL COTTAGE – HILL 
52 – VOID FARM (inclusive) present frontline of PREFIX [11th Border 
Regiment] – VEALL COTT[AGES] – to enclosures at V.2.d.9.2.  
 
2. PRINT [2nd KOYLI] will withdraw out of line at dusk.  
 
3. PORT [16th NF] and PRAISE [16th HLI] will push forward on to HILL 52. PORT 
on right, PRAISE on left to VOID FARM inclusive.  
 
4. PREFIX will consolidate their present holdings – reorganise and gain touch.   
 
5. PRESS [17th HLI] will collect on its original tapes, reorganize, move to south of 
MALLET COPSE and envelope VEAL COTTAGE and VAT COTTAGE from 
the east in conjunction with Stokes mortars.  
 
6. PONY [15th LF] will insure enclosures at V.22.a.9.2 are firmly consolidated, push 
out and join hands with PRESS.  
 
7. PLAIN [14th Brigade] will move through PRISM and attack on the night 3rd/4th 
[December] after which PRISM will withdraw.   
 
8. OCs must inform Brigadier their appropriate line early tomorrow.  
 
9. The hour of Zero will be at 2 a.m. 3rd inst. a[t] which hour a protective machine-
gun and artillery barrage will open clear of all objectives.  
 
10. ACKNOWLEDGE. Issued at 3:50 p.m. 2/12/17 
 
 
      H. Wailes Capt.  
      for Brigade Major 
      PRISM 
 
      Copies to: 
      
1. PRESS 
2. PRAISE 
3. PREFIX  
                                                 
20
 Original document hastily written in long hand. See TNA: WO/95/2370. 32
nd
 Division War Diary.  
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4. PONY  
5. PORT  
6. PANAMA [???]  
7. PLAIN  
8. PROCTOR [???]  
9. PILL [???]  
     10 & 11. War Diary 
     12. BM 
     13. 25
th
 Inf. Bde.  
     14. Staff Capt.  
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Appendix 11 
 
 
97
th
 Brigade Order No. 18221 
 
 
1. Operation Order No. 181 is cancelled.  
 
2. Back battalion will ensure that tomorrow, they are occupying before dawn, a 
position at least as far forward as the original tapeline. Having gained the tapeline, 
every endeavour will be made to launch forward as far in advance of the line as is 
possible.  
 
3. Touch, if not already gained, will be established with units on the flanks the 
greatest care taken to preserve it once gained.  
 
4. Companies & platoons will be reorganized.  
 
5. Lewis Gun posts will be established in front of line taken up.   
 
6. OC 97th MG Co. will post as many available guns of his own company & 8 guns 
of 96
th
 MG Co. for close defence of the line.  
 
7. Units will report to this headquarters as soon as this order has been carried out 
and give the following ??? ??? ??? give limits of battalions‟ boundaries, as much 
ground as possible in advance of this line will be.  
 
8. 16th Batt. NF –  TEALL COTTAGE inclusive to VIRILE [FARM]* 
 
16
th
 HLI – TEALL COTTAGE inclusive to VIRILE [FARM]* 
 
11
th
 Border Regiment – VIRILE FARM (enclosures) to V.29.b.1.5 
 
17
th
 HLI – V.29.1.5., V.29.a.3.3  
 
15
th
 LF – V.29.a.3.3 to TOURNANT FARM – area ???  
 
*OC 16
th
 Batt. (NF) will be responsible for division of frontage between those 
two units (i.e. 16
th
 NF and 16
th
 HLI). Battalions may find it necessary to extend 
their flanks. If it is found that the number of men collected in any unit are out of 
all proportion to length of line taken over, this will arranged between CO‟s 
concerned.  
 
9. ACKNOWLEDGE  
                                                 
21
 Original document hastily written in long hand. See TNA: WO/95/2370. 32
nd
 Division War Diary.  
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      Issued at 9:30 p.m.  
      2/12/17 
 
     Capt. for B. Major 
     97
th
 Inf. Bde 
 
     Copies to:  
 
1. PANAMA 
2. PLAIN 
3. PROSE 
4. PREFIX 
5. PORT 
6. PRAISE 
7. PRESS 
8. PONY 
9. PILL 
10. Staff Capt.  
11. War Diary 
12. File  
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Appendix 12 
 
Copy No. 11 
 
 
97
th 
Inf. Bde. Operation Order No. 18322 
 
 
(1) The 97th Brigade will be relieved in the frontline on night of 3/4th December by 
14
th
 Brigade in accordance with attached table.  
 
(2) All other details of relief will be arranged by OC battalions concerned.  
 
(3) On completion of relief, the command of the line will pass from GOC 97th 
Brigade to GOC 14
th
 Brigade.  
 
(4) Guides will be arranged for each relieving battalions as under: – 
 
            One per Batt. HQ} 
            One per Coy. HQ} To be under command of an officer 
            One per Platoon} 
 
OC 17
th
 HLI will be responsible for finding guides in the right portion from each 
of the following units: – 11th Border Regt., 16th HLI (less those attached to 16th 
NF) and 17
th
 HLI.  
 
(5) Relief complete will be reported to this Headquarters by code words as under – 
 
 Relief complete       HOLES 
 Heavy shelling        DEEP 
 Slight shelling         SHALLOW 
 
(6) All are reminded that soup kitchens exist – 1 off MOUSETRAP TRACK 
B.17.b.9.7. & 1 off No. 6 track at B.23.a.6.7.  
 
(7) ACKNOWLEDGE 
 
            H. Wailes for B[rigade] M[ajor] 97
th
 Infantry Brigade 
 
Issued at 2 p.m. 3/12/17 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Original document hastily written in long hand. See TNA: WO/95/2400, 97 Brigade War Diary.  
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Copies to:  
 
1. 15
th 
LF 
2. 16
th
 LF 
3. 11
th
 Border Regt. 
4. 16
th
 HLI 
5. 17
th
 HLI 
6. 14
th
 Inf. Bde 
7. 96
th
 Inf. Bde  
8. 32
nd
 Division 
9. Brig.  
10. Staff Captain  
11 & 12. War Diary  
13 fill  
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Appendix 13 
 
Battalion Commanders’ Remarks in Response 
to 25 Brigade Questionnaire G1/79 
 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.R.H. Stirling (CO 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire)  
 
As regards the questions contained in your G1/79 I beg to report the following:  
 
A. Barrage 
 
1. Was effective as far as I can gather.  
2. But there were many shorts. 
3. Officers state that the barrage seemed to lift too quickly after the original 
beginning. All agree that the defensive barrage of artillery ??? ??? was excellent.  
 
B. Assembly  
 
1. The duckboards were raised too high above ground, so when the men got off 
where there were gaps, it was difficult to get on again.  
2. A new tape should have been laid from the head of the duckboards, as the old one 
was hardly discoverable.  
 
C. Enemy Fire 
 
1. Enemy‟s barrage came down from our old frontline back to behind the 
PASSCHENDAELE – VINDICTIVE X roads. Probably field guns on the 
frontline and heavy stuff on both sides of the road.  
 
D. Forming-up 
 
1. 2 small tapes were all that could be desired. 
2. Yes, but some of them were not securely fastened and had moved in the wind.  
 
E. Equipment 
 
1. I do not think overloading was noticed except in the mud and on the duckboards, 
but I think the carrying of spare stores [?] by the 3
rd
 wave was a mistake as: 
 
a. These never eventuated 
b. The platoon would have been invaluable as a support but got it into its 
head that it was there to carry.  
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I consider a totally separate carrying party to go up when the barrage had 
moderated would be better.  
 
2. No shortage. 
 
I attribute the lack of complete success to lack of depth on my centre due to the 
easing off of to keep touch with the left. I should like to mention the great help 
given by Lt. Francis (Bde Int[elligence] Of[fice[r]) in getting us on the tapes. I 
consider that the forming-up could only have been done in moonlight, but the 
attack would have gone better if it had been darker, as the Germans could not 
have located where are men were and I think, in this case, we could have held on 
to the [Southern] redoubt.
23
  
 
 
 
      Lieutenant-Colonel N.M.S.  Irwin (CO 2
nd
 Lincolnshire) 
 
      Notes 
 
      a. (1) [Barrage]  
 
1. Barrage when it came down was efficient. 
2. One or two how [itzer] s were repeatedly firing short in S + T zones as far back 
as VINDICTIVE Crossroads. 
3. Owing to advance being held up by MG fire from MGs on our side of the 
barrage line it is not possible to determine whether the pace of the barrage was 
suitable.  
 
      b. (2) [Assembly] 
 
1. The continuation of the duckboard track No. 5 S [outh] was heartbreaking. 
There was not more than 20 yards length continuous + track was laid too high 
off the ground. It took an overloaded man over 3 ½ hours walk from WIELTJE 
to MOSSELMARKT instead of under 2 hours by road. Owing to the condition 
of the track, my battalion and the Berkshires were a little mixed up by the head 
of the track, otherwise the assembly was not worried much. Hostile fire caused 
an average of 10-15 casualties a company before assembly.  
 
      c. [Enemy Fire]  
 
1. At about Zero + 9 fell around VINDICTIVE Crossroads westward. 
2. It was his MG and rifle fire (rifle fire negligible), which stopped the advance. 
His MGs opened at Zero + 3 minutes. 
 
 
                                                 
23
 „TNA: WO/95/1929: „Appendix B‟, 5 December 1917, 2nd Royal Berkshire War Diary.  
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      d. [Forming-up]  
 
1. Yes, tapes were well laid + the direction.  
2. Tapes were undoubtedly useful.  
 
      e. [Equipment] 
 
1. For the attack the men were not overloaded, although the condition of Track 
No. 5 made the men dead tired before Zero.  
2. There was a shortage of Lewis Gun magazines + I think it would be a good 
thing to distribute these drums throughout assaulting troops.
24
  
 
 
 
     Lieutenant C. Anderson (Adjutant & Acting CO 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade) 
 
     Headquarters 25
th
 Infantry Brigade                 Secret 
 
     In reply to your G1/79, herewith information as required: –  
 
     a. BARRAGE 
 
1. Very efficient. 
2. Not many shorts. 
3. Pace was found suitable. 
 
     b. ASSEMBLY 
 
1. Carried out with only slight interference from the enemy, although, from their 
subsequent action, the forming-up on the tapes was apparently observed by them.  
 
     c. ENEMY‟S FIRE 
 
1. No enemy barrage on our front or support lines. Searching fire from about Zero + 
5 in rear of support line.  
2. Machine-gun fire particularly deadly. Machine-guns firing low – about 2 feet 
from the ground.  
 
     d. FORMING-UP 
 
1. Under the circumstances (i.e. Teall Cottage being in the hands of the enemy) the 
tapes were all that could be desired.  
2. The direction tapes proved useful in the advance.  
 
                                                 
24
 TNA: WO/95/1730: „Report on Action of the Battn. from 2:30 p.m. 1-12-17 – M.N. 2/3-12-17‟, 6 
December 1917, 2
nd
 Lincolnshire War Diary.  
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e. EQUIPMENT 
 
1. The men were not overloaded in any case.  
2. There was no shortage except for very lights.25  
                                                 
25
 TNA: WO/95/1731: „Report of the Part Played by the 2nd Battn. The Rifle Brigade in the Recent 
Operations at Passchendaele‟, 6 December 1917, 2nd Rifle Brigade War Diary.  
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Appendix 14 
 
GHQ Instructions for the Defence of the Flesquières 
 and Passchendaele Salients 
26
 
 
                 64 
 
 
                   SECRET 
 
 
General Sir H.S. Rawlinson, Bt., G.V.C.O, K.C.B., Commanding Second Army  
General the Hon. Sir J.H.G Byng, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Commanding Third Army 
 
------------------ 
O.A.D. 291/29 
------------------ 
 
With reference to GHQ no. O.A.D. 291/29, dated the 6
th
 December 1917, describing the 
policy to be pursued in the defensive organization of the British front, the following 
special instructions are issued as a guide to the manner of dealing with the 
FLESQUIÈRES and PASSCHENDAELE salients.  
 
These salients are unsuitable to fight a decisive battle in. It is, however, desirable to retain 
possession of them if they are not attacked in great force; and in the event of attack in 
great force to use them to wear out and break up the enemy‟s advancing troops as much 
as possible before these can reach the battle zone of defence which will be sited 
approximately as [a] chord across the base of each salient.  
 
In accordance with this policy the salient will be held firmly until the battle zone of 
defence behind each has been prepared. The defences of the salients will then be 
organized into advanced or „outpost‟ zones, and as these defences become more 
complete, so the garrisons can be reduced to what is required for the purpose in view.  
 
The whole area of each salient should be organized defensively, in advance of the battle 
zone, with an intermediate system as well as a forward system of defence; the object 
being to compel the enemy to fight for every yard of his advance to the battle zone.  
 
For the defence of these salients, therefore, after the battle zone is ready for occupation, 
the ground should be held chiefly with machine-guns, supported by artillery, and aided 
with ample barbed wire obstacles skilfully placed and hidden. Selected machine-gun 
companies might be detailed for the defence of stated sectors, and kept permanently (with 
reliefs) for a definite purpose.  
                                                 
26
 TNA WO/158/209: Second Army Operations File. 
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In the same way each sector should be under a specially chosen officer for preparation 
and defence.  
 
In certain few portions of the area counter-attack will be possible. These must be foreseen 
and arranged for. At other points surprise counter-attacks with machine-gun fire will be 
possible. All this requires a special garrison, and leaders imbued with the offensive spirit 
even though forced to act on the defensive.  
 
     
                       (Sd). L.E. Kiggell 
                Lieut. –General  
                                                                                                   Chief of the General Staff 
 
G.H.Q.  
 
13
th
 December 1917  
 
Copies addressed personally to : –  
 
General Sir H.S. Horne K.C.B., Commanding First Army  
General Sir H. de la P. Gough, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding Fifth Army  
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Appendix 15 
 
Lieutenant-General Sir Alymer Hunter-Weston’s 
Confidential Letter 27 
 
 
 
                          Headquarters, VIII Corps 
                                                                                                       BEF December 19, 1917 
 
 
I had an interesting interview this morning with Douglas Haig, the Commander-and-
Chief, at the Army Commander‟s house. Douglas Haig came with „Curly‟ Birch, his chief 
artillery advisor, and asked Rawlinson to get me to meet him at Cassel, so that he could 
get my views on the situation in my area.  
 
 
I went there with Ward and Aspinall, my chief gunner and chief general staff officer 
respectively, taking with me maps showing (i) the dispositions of our artillery; (ii) the 
dispositions of the enemy‟s artillery; (iii) our communications; (iv) our defences as they 
exist, and as I propose; (v) statements showing the very slow rate of progress which our 
plank roads, light railways, etc., are making owing to the difficulties of communication 
and to the effects of the enemy shelling; and (vi) a statement showing the strengths of 
battalions in my divisions, all of which are weak, and some, alas, desperately weak.  
 
 
The Commander-and-Chief arrived about noon, and I went up to Rawlinson‟s own study. 
Curly Birch and I were sent for shortly afterwards. After a pleasant word of greeting we 
plunged into business, and I produced a map showing the positions of our artillery and of 
the enemy‟s artillery. I pointed out to the chief (what I had pointed out to Curly Birch (his 
chief artillery officer) the day before here at my headquarters at Vogeltje) that our guns 
were in such a position that if the enemy made even a moderately successful attack the 
great majority of our guns must be lost. This gave him furiously to think.  
 
 
I pointed out to him the seven-mile length of our communications from Ypres to 
Passchendaele, and the fact that these communications were under hostile shellfire 
throughout their length from both north and south; that the country has been so cut up by 
shellfire that with the exception of such of the German “pillboxes” as were still intact 
nothing remained but shell holes and mud, impassable to guns or any other vehicles, or 
even to men except along the plank roads, tramways or duckboards.  
                                                 
27
 BL: 48366: Letter to Lady Hunter-Weston dated 19 December 1917, Hunter-Weston Diary, Vol. XII. 
Document marginalia in Lieutenant-General Hunter-Weston‟s own hand noted: „Secret. Sent by the hand of 
one of my own officers‟.    
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I showed him that my front was an almost exact semi-circle of 1300 yards radius, 
exposed to enemy artillery fire at easy range from almost three-quarters of a circle – from 
northwest by east by south.  
 
 
I told him that the position at Passchendaele approximated to the position of which he 
had bitter experience at Lombartzyde on the coast; the swamps and the valleys behind 
Passchendaele corresponding to the Nieuport Canal; the Bellevue Ridge and the main 
Broodseinde Ridge, along which alone access to Passchendaele is possible, 
corresponding to the bridges over the canal; and the salient about Passchendaele 
corresponding to the ground that used to be held by us north of the Nieuport Canal.  
 
 
I showed him that if the enemy really concentrated heavy artillery fire on to those two 
spurs (our only corridors of approach) and at the same time put on heavy concentrations 
on to our far too crowded gun positions, while they pulverized the troops and machine-
guns in the Passchendaele Salient with fire, they would be able to smash up our infantry 
and machine-guns in the Passchendaele Salient, and having gained the ground by artillery 
fire, it would remain for hostile infantry to advance and occupy the ground thus won by 
the guns. Our defence against this advance by the hostile infantry lies in the power of our 
artillery to stop any such advance.  
 
 
I pointed out to him, therefore, that if we wished to continue to hold the Passchendaele 
Salient, we must have guns in sufficient quantities and in such positions that they could 
mow down any hostile attacks on the salient. This necessitates having our guns forward 
in such positions that they were within reach of a successful minor attack by the enemy, 
and, indeed must form a tempting bait to him.  
 
 
I furthermore pointed out how the fact of holding the salient with such long and 
precarious communications necessitated an immense amount of labour, and showed that 
owing to the great distance the labour had to go over bad communications, in order to get 
to the forward part of the area, the amount of work that could be done by the men in that 
front area was very small, even when the hostile shelling permitted any work to be done 
at all.  
 
 
After getting him to understand this position, and making him feel very uncomfortable 
about the position of these guns, which, indeed, we could very ill-afford to lose, I 
continued to say that if my opinion were asked (my opinion had not been asked, but I felt 
it important to make him know my opinion politely and firmly) I should unhesitatingly 
recommend that the preparation of a strong position on the Pilkem – Clapham Junction 
Ridge should be pushed on with as rapidly as possible; an outpost or front position being 
prepared well ahead of it; and that as soon as ever the main Pilkem – Clapham Junction 
position was ready for occupation, the garrison of the Passchendaele Salient should be 
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reduced to a negligible quantity, only sufficient to bluff the Boche, and to prevent him 
from coming on to take that high ground without developing some kind of attack; but that 
it should be clearly recognised that, as soon as the Boche did attack, that garrison, acting 
as a rearguard, would withdraw and leave the horrible Passchendaele Salient to the 
Boche. The advantage of holding it as a rearguard in that way was to delay the Boche, 
and prevent him getting the fine observation over our lines that he would obtain as soon 
as Passchendaele and the tops of the adjacent ridges, just southwest of it, were in his 
hands.  
 
 
My words sank in, and the policy has been agreed to, which is a very good thing. But 
between the adoption of this policy and the possibility of having it properly carried out 
there is a great gulf fixed, for we are short of troops and labour. It will take a considerable 
time to make the Pilkem – Clapham Junction position strong, and until that main position 
with an outpost line in front of it is prepared, we must continue to hold Passchendaele 
fairly strongly, and to have a good number of guns much more forward than I would 
wish. If, therefore, the Boche were to attack the real strength in the immediate future, we 
stand a good chance of suffering loss both in men and materials. However, that cannot be 
helped. We must take the situation (which was none of my making) as it stands, and hope 
firstly: that he will not attack until we are ready, and secondly: that if he does attack now 
we shall be able to defeat him owing to the excellence of our artillery and the gallantry 
our men.  
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Appendix 16 
 
Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge: 
The German Experience from Published Regimental Accounts 28 
 
A 
 
25
th
 Hessisches Division 
 
Leibgarde-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 115: At Passchendaele 
29
 
 
6 November 1917 to 15 February 1918 
 
(1) On 6 November the first elements of the 3
rd
 Garde Division arrived in the rest area 
situated near the Dutch border in order to assume the duties of Division Lokeren. 25
th
 
Division was attached to Gruppe Ypern, whose zone, with three divisional sectors, 
extended northward to link with Gruppe Wijtschate whose front line extended north of 
Ypres from Becelaere to Passchendaele. Train after train rolled smoothly toward the new 
objective so organised that the strength of a full division always remained north of 
Lokeren. Once again, however, to relieve pressure on the rail system, mounted units were 
sent by route march. 
 
 
(2) Regimental staff and I and II battalions formed the first element of the Regiment to be 
transferred. On the afternoon of 6 November they were loaded onto trains at the station at 
Moerbeke and arrived as soon as evening of that day, having passed through Ghent and 
Dienze, at the hub Waereghem, 12 km north of Courtrai. The machine-gun companies, 
field train and combat train elements followed by route march with a stopover at 
Drongen. The regimental staff quartered in Wielsbeke, I Battalion in Vive St Eloi and II 
Battalion in Vive St Bavon (Vive St Baaf); all three villages were just to the northwest of 
Waereghem. Damp, raw weather foretold of the approaching winter. 
 
 
(3) The Regiment remained in these quarters for four days. Hardly had the Garde-
Füsiliere arrived from Exaerde when the regiment, now fully closed [-up], moved to 
another sector further forward in the early morning hours of 11 November. Short rail 
movements brought the battalions through Iseghem, close by Roulers, to Rumbeke; from 
here, new quarters, situated slightly southward, were reached: regimental staff and the 
Garde-Füsilier-Bataillon in Den Hukker, I Battalion in Kaiphas and III in Den Aap. 
Cramped occupation of available billeting in groups of tiny Flemish hamlets was 
necessary. In this area, barely 9 km from the front lines near Passchendaele held by 44
th
 
Reserve Division, the 25
th
 Division sat as Eingreifdivisionen in the northern Abschnitt A 
                                                 
28
 All times related below are Continental i.e., 1 hour ahead of British time.  
29
 Victor von Frankenberg und Ludwigsdorff, Das Leibgarde Infanterie Regiment (1. Grossherzoglich 
Hessisches Nr. 115) im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Stuttgart: Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1921), pp. 157-67.  
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of Gruppe Ypren and assumed thereby the duties of the 11
th
 Division; Grenadier-
Regiment 10 had departed the sector upon arrival of the Regiment. 
 
 
(4) Attacks in this sector of Fourth Army front had continued since the battle of 4 
October. The British threw themselves like wild bulls against an iron wall tenaciously 
held by defenders of the German U-boat bases. 26 and 30 October, as well as 6 and 10 
November, were again days of hard battle.  The weight of our opponents was beaten back 
again and again. Only minor adjustments of the front gave witness to the seesaw battle. 
The German lines held: in the final account because the tactical requirements for the 
defence reinforcement and relief were well managed by the leadership. Behind almost 
every division in the forward line stood a second as a counterattack force, behind these 
often yet another reserve. 
 
 
(5) So it was also here. Gruppe Staden closed in to the right. In its left sector, 4
th
 Division 
was in positions, the 199
th
 Division behind them. Left, in Abschnitt B, the 11
th
 Reserve 
Division held the forward line; 11
th
 Bavarian Division was the attack division. In a 
gapless chain of divisions, the 25
th
 Division, in the second echelon, sat close behind the 
battlefront, ready to jump into the fight. 
 
 
(6) This assignment was filled with arduous challenges. The leadership had to discover 
the various possibilities for deployment and organise and prepare the forces; it was left 
for units to determine and specify attack and assembly areas in the vicinity. The 
Division‟s infantry comprised three separate attack groups; while IR117, as Gruppe 
Alice, composed a forward echelon, the Regiment was detailed to Gros as Gruppe Ernst 
Ludwig with a field artillery battery, an engineer platoon, dispatch riders and medical 
personnel; its use foresaw frontal and flanking counter-attacks in its own as well as 
neighbouring sectors. Depending upon the tactical situation assembly areas, or, 
respectively, attack positions nearer the front were to be occupied on the issue of a code 
word.  
 
 
(7) For two days, routes of advance and assigned areas were reconnoitered; the battalions 
accustomed themselves to a general orientation of the terrain. A counter-attack was, 
however, no longer required. Gradually, the enemy‟s reserve must have been drawn off to 
continue the battle elsewhere. An easing of the situation occurred.  The front remained 
unquiet and fluid. With heavy artillery concentrations massing, the cratered fields of 
Flanders settled down for the winter. 
 
 
(8) The strong German reserves remained at first in their sectors and were used for 
periodic relief of units in the forward line. Without the necessity of prolonged rail 
transport of fresh divisions, the opportunity was afforded, through frequent relief, to 
balance the high security coefficient of combat with the necessary recovery of the units.   
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(9) So began for the first time on 14 November, in the northern sector of Gruppe Ypern, 
the replacement of the 44
th
 Reserve Division with the 25
th
 Division. The Regiment was to 
take over the positions of RIR206 on the left flank. Regiments 116 and 117 closed in to 
the north. The new rightmost divisions and Gruppe boundaries began at Mosselmarkt, 
wound from here in a northerly direction approximately parallel to the Roulers-Ypres 
railway line, and described southward a great arc around Roulers; the left divisions and 
Gruppe boundaries followed this general trace to approximately 3 to 4 km. The forward 
line of the entire Division sector enclosed the village of Passchendaele in an arc, which 
the British, at that time, possibly held with their 49
th
 Division;
30
 it [the village] lay 
directly northwest of the Regiment‟s positions. 
 
 
(10) [The Regiment‟s] basic organisation comprised one battalion as covering force, a 
second in the main battle area, the third in reserve, all, for the most part, closely stacked 
behind each other.  The defence developed from a new point of view that realistic 
assessment of the Battle of Flanders had brought about. The concept of a covering force 
area [Vorfeldzone], which had already appeared in the positional warfare southeast of St 
Quentin at Neuville St Amand, had jelled here and been expanded to a defined battle 
zone. Major distinctions were made between the covering force and main battle areas. 
Weak sections of the foremost battalion, their firepower reinforced with light machine-
guns, were to hold the covering force area against enemy reconnaissance and weak 
attacks while, in the event of serious fighting, they were to withdraw step-by-step to the 
so-called line of main resistance [Hauptwiderstandslinie] which, by manoeuvre combat 
from the main battle area, was to be held.  Here too, only a portion of the fighting troops 
were committed: to the rear stood the remainder of the forces, formed as assault 
companies and, according to the situation, reinforced with elements from the main battle 
area, ready for automatic counterattack. Security details and Nahtkommandos
31
 remained, 
as before, excluded for specific defensive assignments.  
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 Passchendaele village was held by 33
rd
 Division (VIII Corps). 49
th
 Division was attached to the 
neighbouring II ANZAC Corps.  
31
 Seam Command or Detachment: A special command team established to control the peculiar difficulties 
encountered at the junction between two units.  
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    German infantry: Flanders December 1917 
                                                               (Source: Author’s Collection) 
 
(11) On the afternoon of 14 November the Regiment began movement from its attack 
position in order, within this tactical scheme, to relieve RIR206. The I Battalion reached, 
after barely 5 km march, the area of the sector reserve.  Its four companies lay dispersed 
along the little Veldebach [Velde Brook], just south of the Moorslede-Roulers highway 
crossroad with the Ypres-Roulers railway line; here the regimental command post was 
also located. The I [Battalion] followed the II, which was meant to relieve the foremost 
positions.   
 
 
(12) The Garde-Füsiliere assumed, as the trail, the main battle area positions. Deep 
darkness reigned and, with the unfamiliar terrain, made the relief difficult; heavy enemy 
barrages, with harassing fire reaching far into the rear of the advance, slowed movement.  
There was much scattering of units. In the end, it was possible to accomplish the relief 
and secure linkups on both flanks. 
 
 
(13) The ground of the battle area presented a sad, and as with the badly shot up positions 
around Gheluvelt, affecting picture. Swamp and morass dominated the forward area and 
ran in broad swaths in front of and through the friendly positions.  The sea, only 35 
kilometres distant, pushed the ground water to the surface of the pockmarked earth. Also 
here, crater upon crater. Trenches or lines with any semblance of purpose or obvious 
continuity did not exist.  Concrete shelter was as good as non-existent: the commander of 
the covering force area (Kampftruppenkommandeur) north of Moorslede could barely 
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find a concrete slab to shelter under for his command post. The companies lay grouped in 
the open along the Passchendaele-Moorslede road where, earlier, the gas and electric 
works for the 300-metre distant village had provided power and light; to their rear lay the 
joint railway station for both villages. Small, unit-level adjustments brought with them 
into the sector on the night of 16/17 November, a result of displacement of boundaries, 
the former palace of Passchendaele to the north and the cemetery of the brave young 
fighters from 1914.  
 
 
(14) The crater field extended far into the hinterland, a tangle of impassable impregnable 
areas. This led to unfortunate consequences. All logistic and relief efforts were confined 
to the railway and the few roads that led here and there, but seldom in the desired 
direction. The enemy, of course, immediately covered these generously and, 
preferentially at night, with harassing fires and inflicted on us not inconsiderable losses.  
The positioning of our counter-attack companies in tactically advantageous positions also 
caused great difficulties. They lay, spread out, and farther back than the situation 
demanded. More often than not, they were forced to seek and occupy unfavourable 
terrain, which occurred naturally overall. Minor adjustments forward or backward within 
the framework of the new conduct of battle were generally permitted, as well as 
demanded.
32
  
 
 
(15) The artillery activity of the enemy remained extraordinarily lively; in varying 
intensities across the entire battle area as well as the rear, harassing fires of all calibres 
fell; often, individual barrages rose to tremendous intensity. In spite of this, 
communications channels functioned well; for the most part even the telephone 
connections to the KTK remained and reprieved the brave runners, who required 
considerable time to deliver reports and orders. 
 
 
(16) With one relief, the battalions remained in this sector six days.  During the night of 
20/21 November, the Division was again relieved by the 44
th
 Division and, for the same 
period [i.e., 6 days] again pulled back as counter-attack force. The old regimental 
quartering area shifted somewhat eastward; regimental staff and the II Battalion lay in 
Oekene, the I Battalion in the vicinity of Kaiphas-Den Hukker, the Garde-Füsiliere in 
and around Bergmolens. The 6
th
 and 7
th
 companies from Oekene later joined the 
machine-gun formations of all battalions, who had found quarters in Rumbeke. As a 
result of this adjustment, the forward attack positions and assembly areas were 
correspondingly adjusted, reconnaissance of which became necessary. 
 
 
(17) Major von Rettberg, severely ill with typhus, was on leave that commenced at the 
end of October. Unfortunately, his return to health took so long that he was unable to 
return to the Regiment, which owed its victories in so many fights and battles to his 
extraordinarily brilliant leadership. He was, at first, replaced by Hauptmann Appuhn, 
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  46 
who turned over command on 19 November to Major von Westerhoven who, by Supreme 
Cabinet Order, had been named regimental commander; before the war he had been a 
general staff officer of 5
th
 Division, most recently chief of the general staff of VII Reserve 
Korps.   
 
 
(18) On the afternoon of 26 November, the leaders of RIR206 stood on the roads leading 
from Duivelshoeken to the west, preparing to guide the Regiment, fresh after a six day 
rest, into the old positions. With their machine-gun companies, the battalions took 
possession of the position in one night: I Battalion the covering force area, II the main 
battle area, the Garde-Füsiliere Battalion remained back in reserve. In the new 
regimental command post, moved back slightly during the sector occupation by RIR206 
and now consisting only of wooden barracks, the sector turnover occurred in the early 
morning hours of 27 November. 
 
 
(19) Seven difficult days followed. From innumerable gun tubes, the enemy, in his 
accustomed manner, shelled anything that even remotely seemed suitable for defence, 
quartering, advance, or assembly.  His superiority in munitions ate, in heavy salvos, into 
the aching terrain.  His heavy calibre guns reached well into the reserve zone.  The winter 
days appeared to be too short for the enemy fliers: at night if there was moonlight, they 
dove to fly close to the earth, shot their machine-guns and dropped bombs on suspected 
positions.  From the relief of opposing infantry the possibility of attacks in sector was 
assumed; for 28 November, heightened readiness was ordered.  Two companies from the 
main battle area were moved to the rail embankment south of Bakrats-Hof, the reserves 
pushed forward to the railway spur. Indeed, these by-the-book precautions proved 
premature. Only some days later, in the night of 2 December, did pounding denial and 
destructive fires begin on both sides in overwhelming strength, descending across the 
Division from the north flank; firing that, after pauses, increased in the afternoon. Green, 
yellow, red and white flares burst in colourful, indecipherable series throughout the night, 
evidence of a bloody firefight. The right sector of the Division, in which IR117 was 
deployed, was attacked. The Regiment had to give up its I Battalion, which, on 30 
November, had been pulled back into reserve; it was deployed and eked out two full days 
in the forward-most lines of the adjacent right sector. 
 
 
(20) The heavy artillery activity of the enemy resulted in loss after loss. At the beginning 
of December, the entire II Battalion had barely 100 rifles (i.e., effective strength) 
available in the main battle area. Irrespective, every night, patrols went across the 
forward area toward the enemy, reconnoitered in minute detail the trafficability of the 
difficult terrain, and determined the enemy‟s foremost line began at the ruins of the 
church at Passchendaele.  They lay, as did the entire area, on a high ridge and the British 
had here numerous advantages. He [the enemy] sat, without marshes, on dry ground, and 
the rubble of Passchendaele offered him welcome cover. The task organisation the II 
Battalion ordered for its infantry and machine-gun sections in the battle area was 
exemplary.   
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(21) On the night of 3/4 December the 16
th
 Division moved into Abschnitt A of Gruppe 
Ypern to take over the positions. The regiment, relatively drained by the preceding 
difficult days, turned over, after successful relief, responsibility to IR68 and pulled back 
under cover of darkness to the small village of Beythem on the Menin-Roulers highway 
and was conducted by escort platoons to the new divisional rest area, bordered westward 
through Kachtem, east through Ginste. 
 
 
(22) Here, between Courtrai and Thourout the Division served as Army reserve and 
remained initially and then continued under the orders of the Gruppe-Ypren for Sector A. 
Eventually, the term „Assault Division‟ was supplanted by the new term “Army 
Reserve”. The Army was ceded authority over relief and combat employment. Duties 
remained much the same as before.  
      
 
(23) In this framework, for quarters, the regiment was assigned Meulebeke and the 
hamlets near it for the staff and its I and II battalions and for the Garde-Füsiliere 
[Battalion] the northern part of Ingelmünster, seat of the corps staff. The report that a 
change of mission between defence divisions and the Army reserve was, in future, only to 
be every twelve days was met with joy.  In this way, the well-being of the brave fighters 
of Flanders was improved. 
 
 
(24) A shift of the rest area further southward became necessary on 6 December since the 
Division had been assigned the southern Abschnitt C of the Gruppe. The Regiment 
moved with the staff, I [Battalion] and Gard-Füsiliere Battalion to Hulste, the II to 
Lendelede, and was positioned on both sides of the Courtrai-Brugge highway. Great care 
was taken here to reconnoiter and prepare assembly areas and attack positions, including 
those for [possible] deployment into the neighbouring Gruppe Wijtschate zone. The 
commanding general of the Gardekorps comprising Gruppe Ypern, Excellency
33
 von 
Böckmann, an old Life Guardsman, inspected the regiment on 14 December at Hulste. 
 
 
(25) With the passing of twelve rest days, the division was newly deployed, this time to 
the left flank of the leftmost Abschnitt C of the Gruppe. Eighteen days in position were to 
ensue. A detailed relief plan, this time developed beforehand, greatly reduced the 
pressure on units assigned to still difficult forward positions through efficient division of 
responsibilities. The fighting went over, in the end, to trench warfare again, and the first 
priority again became providing the basic needs of life for the deployed forces. Trench 
construction offered here the only possibility. Despite this, the leadership had not 
inconsiderable difficulty in countering the fighting troops‟ natural aversion to digging in.  
It was a natural obstacle that had to be overcome.  
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„Exzellenz‟, Generalmajore were addressed as „Herr Generalmajor‟. 
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(26) On 16 December the Regiment was led by escort platoons from Lendelede to 
Ledeghem: mounted formations route marched; the field trains remained in Hulste and 
Lendelede.  From Ledeghem it was a short stretch to the northward-oriented sector of the 
36
th
 Reserve Division; in the hamlets Nachtegaal, Roodbaard, Klaskapperie and 
Rockuitkapel the battalions stood ready to, in the coming hours of darkness, relieve RIR5 
in the northern sector of the division, with the Garde-Füsiliere in the covering force area, 
I Battalion in the main battle area, and II in reserve; regiments 117 and 116 closed in due 
course to the left, and RIR23 to the right. 
 
 
(27) Two regimental front widths were north of Becelaere, the new sector stretched in an 
approximate 1,000 metre-wide strip from Keiberg on the right flank in almost west-east 
direction to the main road and railway line Menin-Roulers; two small streams, Heyle and 
Passchendaele creeks, ran through it; hedges and tree lines covered the ground.  
Characteristic of the terrain and for the entire sector was the absolute lack of regularity: 
every point could be observed by the enemy, who generally lay on higher terrain; even 
the reserves east of St Pieter were not spared from this. Therefore, any traffic, including 
runners, was restricted by day to the absolute minimum. The Flanders crater field was 
here also the first rule for the possibility of quartering; concrete structures were non-
existent in this area of previous deepest penetration by the enemy.  Only a few „Siegfried 
foxholes‟ existed.  Ground water complicated the construction of earthworks throughout.   
 
 
(28) Here the Regiment set about imposing its expressed will of becoming master of a 
difficult situation. The tactical advances that, in the interim, had transformed organisation 
to successful defence came into good use in the occupation of the entire battle space. All 
forces in the area available to the commander of the covering force area, consisting of the 
covering force battalion, two companies of the main battle area battalion, one and a half 
machine-gun companies, and a mortar platoon, constituted a fighting squadron 
(Kampfstaffel). They deployed as a covering force company, three companies of the main 
line of resistance that bore the designations A, B and C and, from these elements, some 
were deployed in the defence line of the covering force area as well as Nahtkommandos 
in the sector of the right-neighbouring regiment and, finally, two counter-attack 
companies close behind the main line of resistance. Significant expansion of the covering 
force area with security and defence lines represented, above all, a new development.  
The depth here was over 1,200 metres. From Keiberg the main line of resistance was 
flagged to the rear for the artillery. The command post of the covering force area 
commander was located at Waterdamhoek. 
 
   
(29) Some 4 km rearward lay the so-called „thrust squadron‟, comprising the remaining 
two companies of the main battle area battalion and a half machine-gun company.  
Security details were deployed to the artillery positions running along the Spriethoek. 
The regimental command post was located along the Menin-Roulers highway. With two 
companies close by and two companies at Rockuitkapel, the reserve battalion stood at the 
disposal of the Gruppe.  
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(30) The question of relief in the context of the entire occupation and the new 
organisation was admirably solved: the II Battalion and Garde-Füsiliere relieved each 
other in two rotations between the forward position and reserve after six days; the I 
Battalion relieved, each time with two companies, twice after five and once after four 
days.   
 
 
(31) The construction of the positions began; a comprehensive construction plan was, 
again, after a long absence, issued. The first stage consisted of wire obstacles that, at first, 
in the battle area consisted of a basic protective form. The expansion of shellproof 
structures ensued.  Shell craters were connected and expanded into crater nests.  The 
entire defence began again to take on an integrated character. The regimental engineer 
Depot Glypskapelle provided the necessary building materiel. 
 
 
(32) The securing of the means of communication was assured through redundancy. A 
telephone net with four switches and a total of 43 connections ran throughout the area; a 
four-faceted light signal net of large light signal apparatuses supplemented this. In 
addition, the forward-most companies also possessed the ability to communicate with the 
covering force area commander via the new small „Light Signal 16 Apparatus‟.  Should 
telephones or light signals fall victim to combat effects or unfavourable weather, runners 
with a seven-link reporting chain or carrier pigeons from four release points came into 
action.  
 
 
(33) Signal points with flare pistols and hand-held flares constituted the liaison with the 
artillery; even the MG companies utilizing special base guns, taken from the practise of 
the artillery, were prepared to respond to alarms in security positions. There were also 
messenger dogs, though there had been bad experiences with these: a particularly painful 
one had occurred in the earlier fighting by shifting fire onto Lille. 
 
 
(34) Enemy artillery activity confined itself at first to a moderate level; in the experiences 
of the last weeks and months, it was hoped this heralded decisive German fire superiority.  
Only in the beginning of December did it increase again. The enemy concentrated 
primarily on the bridges of the Heule and Passchendaele creeks, in the vicinity of 
Waterdamhoek, on crossroads, and the rearward areas. Keiberg also received heavy fire 
frequently, often 1,000 rounds in two hours. Casualties for the Regiment, which in this 
period in the lines amounted to 15 dead and 50 wounded, were not particularly high.  
More telling were the staggering losses due to illness – almost 100 in just a few days.  
The harsh winter stopped its advance and settled into the waterlogged crater field.  
Ground fog rose and settled into the lungs of the brave fighters who waited in increased 
readiness. Ice-cold nights gripped the open field, frost and snow showers alternated.  
Water froze, thawed and refroze into ice sheets. Above all, the fighting squadrons, 
engaged in sharp defence, suffered without protection against this weather. Often, the 
frozen [men] rose from damp corners of the field to respond to a complete re-organisation 
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of the forces overnight. And despite all obstacles here the offensive spirit also remained 
intact. Night after night the foremost battalion sent reconnaissance patrols forward 
against the enemy, gained control of the intervening ground, and brought back valuable 
intelligence.  Especially noteworthy among the unshakeable leaders were Vzfw. Billeb of 
5
th
 Company; Leutnant d.R. Goebel; Unteroffiziere Astheimer, Möser and Lehr; Gefreiten 
Dickel and Anderl of 9
th
 Company; as well as Vzfw. Gembe of the 11
th
  Company.  When 
no patrols went forward, the MG companies directed their nightly harassing fire frontally 
against the enemy positions before Molenaarelsthoek and enfilading fires to the east of 
Zonnebeke and the Polygon Wood. 
 
 
(35) So the year 1917 approached its end. On 23 December the Regiment sent a detail of 
4 officers and 19 men to a parade for the Emperor [Kaiser Wilhelm II] in Deinze. 
Christmas and New Years‟ could only be celebrated by the rearward elements of the 
Regiment, the reserve, and the two counter-attack companies.   
 
 
 
B 
     
  Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 116: The Battle in Flanders: Passchendaele & Becelaere
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               November - December 1917 
 
(1) The 25
th
 Division began to relieve 3
rd
 Garde Division on 6 November. This was 
accomplished in a way that insured a full strength division was placed at Ghent. The 
transport trains took the Division to Aersele, Waereghem and Denterghem. Regimental 
transport and the machine-gun company, halting in Lederberg before proceeding to 
Ghent, traveled by foot.  
 
 
(2) The Division moved forward to relieve 11
th
 Division on 11 November. The Regiment 
boarded a waiting train for Rumbeke without its transport. It then moved to Oekene and 
Cachtem where it relieved IR38. The transport was subsequently stored in Rumbeke. The 
Division was now a designated Eingreifdivision for the north sector of Gruppe Ypern 
which was situated between Gruppe Staden and Gruppe Wijtschate. It would defend 
positions from Passchendaele to Becelaere. 
 
 
(3) By the close of October the English had attacked continuously at Passchendaele, 
Becelaere and Gheluvelt. Passchendaele village was lost during 6 and 10 of November. 
Further enemy attacks were imminent. The Regiment immediately sent forward an 
Abteilung to Division Abschnitt A in order to gather information [about the sector]. 
Preparations had to be made concerning approaches, defences and counter-attack 
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 Prof. Albert Hiss, Infanterie-Regiment Kaiser Wilhelm (2. Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 116 
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positions. Code word „Triarier Aufmarsch’ meant to go forward [from vicinity of De 
Ruiter] to open the front; „Fridericus Rex’ 35 meant to stand [about Vierkavenhoek] in 
readiness from south of De Ruiter. 25
th
 Division would advance in support of 44
th
 
Reserve Division on receipt of these orders. 
 
 
 
    British prisoners at IR116 HQ near Gheluvelt 26 September 1917. The kilted Tommy is probably 
    from 4/5
th
  Black Watch, 118 Brigade, 39
th
 Division. (Source: Author’s Collection) 
 
(4) On 14 November IR116 moved into Abschnitt B to relieve RIR205. I Battalion was 
placed in reserve by Vierkavenhoek (later in Zilverberg and Le Cavalier), while the III 
became the Bereitschaft [support] unit at Magermeirie; II Battalion became fighting 
battalion in the frontline position, where it experienced heavy losses from artillery fire. A 
grenade killed Leutnant d.R. Baasch of 8
th
 Company during the relief.  
 
 
(5) The frontline was in the same location it had been in October 1914. Weeks of fighting 
in this place of devastation would occur again. The area was very similar, although there 
were fewer shelters, to the Gheluvelt sector. The KTK found, after much searching, a 
concrete pillbox to use as HQ. Companies lay in shell holes and there was little room to 
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 The Triarier Raum was the reserve assembly area. Fridericus Rex was the codename for the support 
assembly area. These zones were established east of the Flandern I Line.  
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manoeuvre. In front of the Hauptwiderstandslinie stretched a strip of Vorfeldzone to be 
defended elastically. Beyond this was the enemy line. The Regiment, however, did not 
feel secure because it lacked men to defend the Sicherungslinie facing the enemy. 
Positions of the Kampfbataillion were echeloned as far as the KTK. The Stosskompagnie 
and Nahtkommandos were sent to the right and left flanks [of IR115 and IR117], while 
machine-gun positions were hastily assigned.  
 
 
(6) Two to three kilometres existed between the support and reserve battalion. The new 
method of defence provided for a tremendous amount of artillery fire support. Zones 
were now to be defended in place of trench lines; Tiefengliederung [distribution in depth] 
was the solution. The 2 to 3 kilometres distance was important to the Meldewesen 
[signals]. This became the building block to a very important report centre under the 
supervision of Leutnant d.R. Geck.  
 
 
(7) The KTK was near the telephone centre, which failed to function due to weather 
conditions. Wireless, Luftfunker [aerial signalman] and light signals were subsequently 
utilized. Messenger dogs and many pigeons were also used, but the latter were not very 
reliable. Ypern Siren [?], bugle and flares provided connection with the artillery. This 
system was [more] efficient. The most reliable connection was through runners who 
communicated information mouth to mouth. Runners were particularly selected for their 
daring and excused duty from the immediate frontline. One of these (Gef. May) was 
indestructible and known as “Kugelsicher” [bulletproof]; he was totally reliable and 
nothing could bring him down. May was subsequently honoured with the award of Iron 
Cross I Class for his exploits during this period. It was extremely important to use code 
words, acronyms and cryptographic messages when communicating through the 
Meldewesen, because the enemy had developed a system to listen in.  
 
 
(8) The fighting capacity of our infantry was limited during the first days in this position, 
because the regiment was under strength. The area to be defended was constricted, 
especially opposite the Kolonnenhof [Exert Farm]. An exchange of battalions was to 
occur in two days, but was impossible owing to severe weather conditions. The rain was 
so heavy that the right flank company was separated from the Regiment by a swamp. 
Enemy artillery was very close and bombarded the position continuously.  
 
 
(9) The traditional Sanitätspause was maintained no matter where the English fought. 
There was a great deal of activity by enemy fliers who frequently strafed positions 
occupied by the Regiment. These airmen also dropped leaflets asking the men to get out 
of their shell holes [and surrender]. They thought we would give ourselves up. The 
English threw out leaflets near Gheluvelt announcing their tremendous successes in 
Flanders; this was the way our enemy perceived events on the battlefield.   
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(10) 20 November was the day the English attempted a breakthrough near Cambrai and 
RIR208 relieved IR116. Following this, the regiment moved into quarters previously 
vacated six days earlier. The Division was once again designated Eingreifdivision. This 
peaceful period, lasting six days, was used to construct shelters, rest and train. On 26 
November 25
th
 Division relieved 44
th
 Reserve Division as Kampfdivision in Abschnitt A. 
IR116 replaced RIR208 near Passchendaele. The positioning of battalions was identical to 
that of our first tour in this sector. 
 
 
(11) Shell holes held by the infantry were rapidly filling up with water. The men were 
pressed for time in applying the new method of Siegfried Unterschlupfe [Siegfried 
Shelter], which worked very well. Eight to ten concave corrugated metal sheets were 
placed one after the other over a flat bottom, supported by steel posts and then covered 
with 1 metre of earth. This gave four to six infantrymen protection from shell splinters, 
rain and cold. Positioned near the remnants of hedges, bushes or buildings, they were 
difficult to locate, even from the air.  
 
 
(12) Fighting now became more severe. An officer‟s patrol under Leutnant d.R. Bode, 
with eight men of 7
th
 Company, reconnoitered as far as Passchendaele Church. The 
enemy infantry, however, remained very quiet. An increase in hostile artillery fire led to 
the realization that the enemy was preparing another attack. The KTK was bombarded 
again and again. Weidenhof [Horne Farm] and Grenzhof [Greenly Corner] were also 
shelled on a daily basis, while the Bereitschaftbataillion [BTK] was bombed from the air 
at Magermeirie.  
 
 
(13) On 30 November, I Battalion relieved III Battalion in the frontline, the latter moving 
into reserve, II into support. Hostile artillery fire became more severe during this day and 
the next. Leutnant d.R. Wust, Vzfw. Rothermel, and four men of 3
rd
 Company were killed 
by a direct hit.  
 
 
(14) At approximately 3:00 a.m. on 2 December, the frontline sustained a surprisingly 
heavy bombardment. The English attacked out of the right swamp in four to five waves 
within a quarter of an hour. They overran the right wing of the Regiment, despite heavy 
resistance, near the boundary of IR117 as far as the Hauptwiderstandslinie. Here a 
tremendous struggle ensued with our 2
nd
 Company and 9
th
 Company of IR117. Men 
hovered around Führer Leutnant d.R.
36
 Schade and Fuchs. Both officers were killed and 
company resistance broke after bitter close-quarter fighting. The enemy was able to 
advance, despite fierce defensive fire, and drive-off the remainder of 2
nd
 Company into 
the swampy low ground beyond. Following this, 4
th
 Company and part of Leib 
Kompagnie from the KTK (Leutnant d.R. Albers) were put in to counter-attack. The 
remnants of Leib Kompagnie, along with five machine-guns, occupied Height 40. IR117, 
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 d.R. = der Reserve. 
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led by Hauptmann von Arnim [Kampftruppenkommandeur of IR117] closed the gap and 
resisted further attacks.  
 
 
(15) III Battalion (in reserve) received orders to proceed to Magermeirie. 6
th
 and 8
th
 
companies were rushed to Pottegemsgut, but were shelled on the way – 10 dead in 8th 
Company. Their brave leader, Leutnant d.R. Meier, was killed while making his way to 
the KTK for orders, after which Vzfw. Schnieder took command of the companies. In the 
meantime, 4
th
 and Leib companies had arrived in place under Leutnant d.R. Hoffmann. 
Leutnant d.R. Plagge was one of the first to be wounded during the counter-attack, but 
Vzfw. Fischer and Krichbaum (Leib Kompagnie) pushed on from trench to trench with 
hand grenades. Hard work was done and the line again in our possession at 
approximately 10:00 a.m. Enemy losses, dead and wounded, were great with twenty 
prisoners being left in our hands, but many good Kamerads on our side were missed.  
 
 
(16) One the heroes of the day was Leutnant d.R. Gombel, who was leader of the 1
st
 MG 
Company. He was killed by artillery fire during the fighting. Vzfw. Gumbrecht, although 
severely wounded, took over Gombel‟s position with a rifle until the struggle came to a 
victorious end. Heavy artillery and air fighting continued throughout the day. This caused 
many casualties. The losses of 3
rd
 Company were especially severe. 
 
 
(17) Fighting died down after nightfall. The reserve battalion was called back to 
Zilverberg; II Battalion was sent forward to replace the battered I Battalion. Our fliers 
reported the enemy line to be heavily occupied at the start of the next day, although the 
expected attack failed to materialize. On 4 December the Regiment was relieved and 
marched to Emelgem, Cachtem and Ingelmunster. Twelve days of peace followed. 
Divisional tactics were changed at this time. 25
th
 Division’s scheduled withdrawal to 
Army Reserve in Gruppe Ypern’s southern sector was postponed due to continued 
training.  
 
 
(18) The Regiment next moved to Lendelede and Winkle St Eloi, where accommodations 
were better. Focus was, after arrival, maintained on regimental business and companies 
continued to train. The long period of rest and re-organisation came to an end on 16 
December. The Hessisches Division then relieved 36
th
 Division in Abschnitt C. 
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C 
 
Infanterie-Leibregiment Nr. 117: To Passchendaele 
37
 
 
8 November to 14 December 1917 
 
(1) The relief of 3
rd
 Guard Division commenced on 6 November. 25
th
 Division was now 
attached to Gruppe Ypern. Gruppe Wijtschate, the line of which extended from 
Passchendaele to Becelaere, joined Gruppe Ypern in the south. The II and III battalions 
left from St Jills at 9:00 a.m., regimental staff and I Battalion departing from St Nicholas 
at 5:00 p.m. The Regiment detrained at Meulebeke and Wareghem during the night of 6 
November. It was necessary to send the field kitchen and horses by train, in order to keep 
transport trains as unencumbered as possible; everyone else had to march. A rest stop was 
made at Ghent during the move forward. 
 
 
 
St Nicholas October 1917: Hauptmann von Arnim (Commander III Battalion) followed by 9
th
 
Company, parades past the regimental staff of IR117 (Source: Offenbacher, Die Geschichte des 
Infanterie-Leibregiments Grossherzogin (3. Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117) 
 
(2) Attached to OHL reserve, the regimental staff, with I and III battalions, moved to 
Meulebeke, while II Battalion was dispatched to Oosttrosebeke. Training was again 
intensified. Hauptmann von Arnim
38
 and III Battalion demonstrated a textbook scheme 
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 Hauptmann Kurt Offenbacher, Die Geschichte des Infanterie-Leibregiments Grossherzogin (3. 
Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117 (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1931).  
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 Hauptmann Achim Konstantin Rudolf von Arnim (1881-1940). Entered military service as Fahnenjunker 
(1.Garde Regiment zu Fuß) 1900; Leutnant 1901; Kriegsakademie 1908-11; Oberleutnant January 1910; 
Attached General Staff 1911-14; Hauptmann March 1914; Assigned General Staff March 1914-May 1916; 
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st
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based on guidelines provided by AOK [Armeeoberkommando] Nr. 4 
39
 for the defence of 
the Vorfeldzone and Hauptwiderstandslinie. The Division was ordered, following the 
arrival of its last elements, to the forward area on 11 November.  
 
 
(3) In the meantime, the English attempted a breakthrough. They were, except for some 
minor gains, unsuccessful. The German front held fast. Behind every division in the 
frontline was an Eingreifdivision. The Regiment moved forward as Eingreifstaffel Alice. 
Billets for HQ Staff and III Battalion were found in De Ruiter, II Battalion in 
Duivelshoeken and I Battalion in Zilverberg.  
 
 
(4) In front was 44
th
 Reserve Division occupying Abschnitt A [east of Passchendaele] of 
Gruppe Ypern. On the right was 199
th
 Reserve Division of Gruppe Staden, with 4
th
 
Division behind. The 11
th
 Division was holding the frontline on the left in Abschnitt B; 
behind it was 11
th
 Bavarian Division. All future planning, intelligence and tactics were 
discussed with the Eingreifgruppen. At the code word „Triarier Aufmarsch‟, the entire 
Regiment would move south of De Ruiter; or to the front, or to the neighbouring sector. 
At code word „Fridericus Rex‟, the Regiment would proceed [from about 
Vierkavenhoek] to Abschnitt A. The Regiment was very busy during the next two days 
reconnoitering various routes and positions to be taken up for the task ahead. Plans were 
also in preparation to relieve 44
th
 Reserve Division in Abschnitt A. This occurred during 
the night of 14/15 November.  
 
 
(5) The I Battalion was deployed as Kampfbataillon across from the northern exit of 
Passchendaele; II Battalion was in the ready position east of the Grensshof, III Battalion 
in reserve. Companies of the Kampfbataillon were situated in muddy shell holes without 
any cover from the elements. The battlefield resembled Gheluvelt, but was actually 
worse. It was impossible to remain in one position because of the morass. There was, 
other than a ruined farmhouse, no shelter or place to establish a KTK. The 
Vorfeldzonelinie stretched in front of the Hauptwiderstandslinie. The Sicherungslinie 
protected the [garrison of the] Vorfeldzone, while the Kampfbataillon was organised in 
depth. The zone stretched all the way to the Gefechtstand [command post] of the KTK, 
and connected to the position of the BTK – 2 kilometres deep as far as the RTK. Shelter 
found in the rear zone was slightly better, the remains of houses and un-splintered planks 
providing cover. The Siegfried housing protected the men from rain and cold. Machine-
guns of all zones were divided and placed into platform positions to be ready for defense. 
The battle was no longer fought in linear trenches; zones would now be defended.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Intelligence) 38
th
 Division August 1914-May 1916; Company Commander Hessisches Infanterie-Regiment 
Nr.115 May-July 1916; Wounded and hospitalized July-December 1916; Battalion Commander Hessisches 
Infanterie-Regiment Nr.115 December 1916-January 1917; Commander III Battalion, Hessisches  
Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 117 January 1917.  
39
 Fourth Army HQ.  
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(6) Enemy artillery fire was very active and heavy. Nevertheless, communications 
remained intact thus saving the lives of many brave runners. At 7:45 a.m. on 15 
November, the enemy increased his artillery bombardment to drumfire on the frontline; it 
appeared he was preparing another attack. Our artillery responded with destructive fire, 
which prevented any movement. At approximately 9:00 a.m., the artillery on both sides 
stopped. A Sanitatspause followed; removal of enemy wounded was then observed.  
 
 
(7) The regimental commander deemed it necessary to relieve forward units after two 
days due to conditions in the frontline and continuous mortar fire. This movement would 
occur despite dangerous conditions on the roads. On the night of 16/17 November, the II 
Battalion moved to the front and became Kampfbataillon. I Battalion was placed in 
reserve, while III Battalion went to Bereitschaftraum [on-call or secondary zone]. The II 
Battalion suffered heavy loss from enemy artillery fire when they wandered forward into 
the English safety line. On the evening of the eighteenth, the HQ of the KTK was heavily 
shelled. A direct hit killed the leader of II Battalion (Hauptmann d.R. Schott), who had 
fought bravely at Bouchavesnes and Gheluvelt. Leutnant d.R. Brandscheid was wounded. 
Obsterleutnant Offenbacher took charge. III Battalion relieved II Battalion in the 
frontline that night. 3
rd
 Company was also sent by the Bereitschaftbataillon (I Battalion) 
as Nahtkompagnie to Kalve to be placed under command of the neighbouring regiment. 
 
 
(8) The high command realised the health of 25
th
 Division was poor after six days [in the 
frontline]. The Regiment was relieved by RIR205 (44
th
 Reserve Division) in Abschnitt 
Nord. 44
th
 Division had the reputation of being unlikable and rowdy; they were the worst. 
The Gefechstand [command post] of the KTK again received a direct hit and the leader of 
the 3
rd
 MG Company (Leutnant d.R. Gerbracht) was killed. Casualties during the six days 
were 2 officers, 23 men killed, 4 officers, 81 men wounded. The regiment again reverted 
to Eingreifgruppe Alice and returned to previously occupied billets where time was spent 
repairing shelters. 
 
 
(9) 26 November brought another change with 44
th
 Reserve Division. The Regiment 
moved into the old sector: I Battalion as Kampfbataillon, II as Bereitschaft and III as 
reserve. It would remain in the line for six days, with a change of battalions occurring in 
two days. Infantry units found the fighting to be heavy from the moment of arrival. The 
reason for this was a need to enlarge the Vorfeldzone, as the enemy was so close that 
lively exchanges between patrols were common. After a few nights the Sicherunglinie 
was enlarged by 300 metres. Trench and dugout construction was impossible due to 
steady rain that transformed the area into swampland. 
 
 
(10) III Battalion replaced II Battalion, while it rained buckets [sic], during the unusually 
quiet night of 1/2 December. A few grenades were found lying about the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie; otherwise it was a dark and stormy night [sic].
40
 Suddenly, 
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around 3:00 a.m., a rushing, wild abriegellungsfeuer [box barrage] was fired beyond the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie. At the same time enemy storm troops rushed the Sicherungslinie. 
These were followed by very strong formations advancing to assault the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie.  
 
 
(11) On the right, the 11
th
 Company, (under the leadership of Leutnant d.R. Huch) 
withstood the assault with 25 men and 4 light machine-guns (08/15). To the left of this 
position was a wide space where 10
th
 Company was positioned under Leutnant Keiper. 
They were sheltering a few English prisoners in their Granatlöchern [grenade holes]. 
Again on the left, separated by another space, Leutnants d.R. Ludewig and Shuhmacher 
and the rest of the 12
th
 Company were positioned. Unteroffizier Sudheimer and Schutze 
Ehrhardt were firing a light machine-gun, sometimes from the front and rear, to avoid 
being overrun. Further left, the next space was occupied in strength by the enemy. The 
rest of 9
th
 Company was in this area with Vzfw. Scherstuhl and 12 men. No one knew 
what happened to Kompagnie Führer Leutnant Fuchs. This small group was fully aware 
that the left wing of the Regiment, along with 2
nd
 Company IR116, was completely 
surrounded.  
 
 
(12) At 3:45 a.m. Leutnant Fuchs‟ young orderly stumbled into Hauptmann von Arnim‟s 
HQ and breathlessly announced that the left sector of 9
th
 Company had been 
unexpectedly attacked. Fuchs had been shot in the heart at very close range. Unteroffizier 
Balz bashed in the assailant‟s head, only to be struck down at the same moment by a 
bullet in the stomach; it was the same everywhere.  
 
 
(13) The English had broken in on a wide front. Hauptmann von Arnim immediately 
ordered a zug [section] of the 1
st
 MG Company to occupy the Aufnahmestellung 
(assembly area). He also grabbed sections of the 2
nd
 and 4
th
 companies to meet the attack 
in front. Leutnants d.R. Lange and Hein (2
nd
 Company) were severely wounded. The 
companies moved toward the front as far as Kapellenhof. Leutnant Hoffmann (4
th
 
Company) followed behind. In the swampy trichtergelände [shell hole terrain] the 
exhausted men, loaded down with heavy packs and machine-guns, were stuck because of 
darkness and bad ground conditions. Only two groups eventually reached the breach. 
Further resistance was hopeless; defending the remaining ground was all that could be 
hoped for. 
 
 
(14) The morning came, and with it, unbelievable behaviour by the English. Troops of 
Sanitäts Komp. 45 assisted with bandaging and cared for our own and the enemy 
wounded.  English stretcher-bearers also provided aid. Our Sanitäts helpers discovered 
there were approximately 150 English in the vicinity of the breach, and altogether about 
600 between and behind their own position. There was no reaction, despite considerable 
local superiority, when Gef. Speiz (9
th
 Company) led eight prisoners away.  
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(15) Hauptmann von Arnim now realised he only had 80 to 90 rifles, 10 machine-guns, 
with limited supplies of ammunition, available. The enemy, however, appeared to lack 
will to continue the struggle. He left Vzfw. Woeste (2
nd
 Company) in charge as he raced to 
the rear to organise a systematic counter-attack.
41
 At 12:00 p.m. Woeste noticed the 
enemy being driven back by 4
th
 Company, IR116. He seized this moment to order an all-
out attack. Taking prisoners as the English hurriedly withdrew, the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie was reached and contact made with Vzfw. Scherstuhl and 9
th
 
Company. 
 
 
(16) In the meantime, artillery fire from both sides continued. It was very difficult for 
companies to maintain a connection. Gef. Becker and Sanität Matzer acted as volunteer 
runners between units. Heavy fighting started again at 5:00 pm. It was especially severe 
for 12
th
 Company. By sheer luck this unit had been issued new hand grenades and was 
thus well equipped to resist. Arrival of darkness also assisted the beleaguered men. 
Stosstruppen arrived at midnight and cleared the Sicherungslinie area without further 
loss. I Battalion IR115 now arrived to relieve the regiment. On the night of 3/4 December 
16
th
 Division relieved the entire [25
th
] Division, IR29 arriving in our sector to take over 
the line. 
 
 
(17) Trains were waiting at Beythem to transport the regiment to new quarters. I 
Battalion went to Meulebeke, II to Ginste and III to Marialoop. Losses during the 
previous six days were: 1 officer (Fuchs) and 59 men killed, 2 officers (Lange and Hein) 
and 145 men wounded, 32 missing. The Division would remain an Eingreifdivision 
attached to Gruppe Ypern in Abschnitt A for the time being. On 8 December it was 
necessary to delay the projected move south. The Division was instead sent to Abschnitt 
C. Its task, however, remained the same. New quarters were taken up: regimental staff, I 
and II battalions to Oyghem, III Battalion to Wielsbeke.  
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Gruppenführer 1932; promoted Oberstleutnant 1939; KIA near Monchy Lagache 24 May 1940.  
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38
th
 Thüringian Division 
 
D 
 
Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 94: The Second Time in Flanders
42
 
 
10 November to 23 December1917 
 
(1) The most difficult Flanders terrain was found in new positions south of the Houthulst 
Forest. Capabilities of our weaponry were diminished for the first time on the Flanders 
front, while the regiment suffered from extreme wet, cold and swampy conditions in the 
forward area.  
 
 
(2) Vizefeldwebel (Vzfw) Maier Eckhardt wrote an article for the Patroullen Zeitung 
announcing the visit of the Grand Duke [Wilhelm Ernest of Saxe Weimar Eisenach] on 
the 24 November, in order to have explained to him the current situation of the [38
th
] 
Division. The Grand Duke first greeted all of the officers and then reviewed the 
Regiment. The view was the clearest experienced by the regiment since its arrival in the 
area, despite the fact that the day was cloudy. For the first time one could see the many 
fine parallel lines of the Flanders landscape. It was so clear that the poplar trees lining the 
road were also discernable. All the important points of the map could be observed. One 
could also view small towns and hamlets at a distance. With a telescope one could see at 
a greater distance, the busy railways in the English hinterland to the smallest detail. The 
landscape could be clearly viewed from the Kemmelberg in the SW, to the ruined 
cathedral at Ypres and the narrow church tower of Poperinghe. 
 
 
(3) This Patroullen Zeitung article described the third largest day of combat experienced 
by the Regiment in the World War. It took place on 2 December 1917 near 
Passchendaele: “As the Regiment left the line on 25 November there was hope for a 
period of rest following the Christmas holiday. For the third time, however, it was to be 
dispatched to the Houthulst Forest. A change of orders arrived that same day. The 38
th
 
Division was now to be sent to a new position. IR94 was quartered in Roulers on this day. 
The Division was put on alert for the frontline on the morning of the twenty-eighth. 
During the evening of 30 November it relieved the position south of Westroosebeke. It 
was clear to the Regiment that this would be the worst fighting so far encountered on the 
Flanders front”. 
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 Alexander von Hartmann, Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 94 
im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Verlag von Klasing & Co., 1921). 
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(4) The English desire to capture the Westroosebeke heights could only be achieved by 
frontal attack. The position had to be held at all costs. III Battalion relieved the frontline 
as planned on the night of 1 December. The will of the officers and men surmounted all 
difficulties as they moved forward, even though this swampy, muddy sector was 
unknown to the Regiment. Three Englishmen were captured and important disclosures 
made. Artillery fire was very heavy and continued into the night hours.  
 
 
(5) Enemy artillery fire decreased during the early hours of 2 December. By 2:00 a.m., 
everything was eerily quiet over the entire area. This quietude was a bad omen. The men 
continued to make their rabbit holes as comfortable as possible, while maintaining good 
spirits and always being vigilant.  
 
 
(6) Shortly before 2:00 a.m. an English patrol approached on the right of 2
nd
 Company 
and was shot down. The Vorfeldzone then reported that much activity and moving about 
could be seen in the enemy lines. At first this movement was believed to be only a relief 
in progress. Shortly before 3:00 a.m., it was realised by 9
th
 Company that an English 
assault on the Vorfeldzonelinie was imminent. Annihilation [artillery] fire was 
immediately called for.  
 
 
(7) The English attack commenced at 2:20 a.m. The German defensive barrage 
commenced firing, while simultaneously the English drumfire bombarded our line. The 
English were very strong, attacking IR94 with three battalions. The men in the outpost 
line opened strong fire with rifles and machine-guns. Artillery and Minenwerfer fire also 
inflicted great loss on the enemy. The English, nevertheless, constantly sent more men 
forward and broke through the Vorfeldzonelinie in two places. Thereafter, they reached 
the Hauptwiderstandslinie [east of Hill 52]. Like the opening of floodgates, the English 
came in on the right flank and in the centre of the 11
th
 Company holding the 
Vorfeldzonelinie. Fighting step by step, the Regiment had to give up the position, 
resisting with hand grenades and, in certain places, bloody hand-to-hand combat with the 
bayonet. The 9
th
 Company was sent forward and fought with continuous rifle and 
machine-gun fire.  
 
 
(8) The attack was halted on the left wing [opposite Northern Redoubt and Teall 
Cottage], while the threat on the right wing forced a retirement to the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie. Like islands, the garrison of the Vorfeldzonelinie remained in 
groups and fought back. At 3:15 a.m. the English appeared before the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie, but well aimed fire forced them to retire. Five prisoners were 
captured during their retreat. They claimed to be intoxicated during interrogation.
43
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 Accusations of intoxication among attacking British and Dominion troops was a common German 
assertion that was „almost certainly not true‟. See Nigel Cave, Passchendaele: The Fight for the Village 
(London: Leo Cooper, 1997), p. 108.  
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(9) Whilst 9
th
 Company reoccupied the Hauptwiderstandslinie, 2
nd
 Company immediately 
passed through to advance a further 20 metres and reoccupied the Vorfeldzonelinie. The 
Regiment had freed itself from danger of encirclement. Serious fighting occurred in the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie, as machine-gun fire from 3
rd
 Company forced the enemy to 
retreat. 12
th
 Company also demonstrated courageous resistance.  
 
 
 
Defensive Battle by Passchendaele 2.12.17: ‘Engländernest’ denotes bight of ground secured during 
16
th
 NF’s late afternoon counter-attack. (Source: Hartmann, Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog 
von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 94 im Weltkrieg) 
 
(10) On the right wing, the Hauptwiderstandslinie of the neighbouring regiment 
splintered under constant machine-gun fire. Unteroffizier Rohne remained like a 
cornerstone at his post and secured the position through flanking fire together with 1
st
 
Company against the advancing enemy. This brought the fighting to a standstill. The 
strong defence of the KTK and the 4
th
 Company prevented further attacks from 
developing. Fighting ceased with the arrival of dawn.  
 
 
(11) English medical personnel arrived around 9:00 a.m. Efforts to recover their dead and 
wounded were observed at many places before our line. 4
th
 Company removed the 
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remaining English dead and wounded from the Vorfeldzonelinie. The sector of the 
neighbouring regiment was cleared of the remaining English with the assistance of 4
th
 
Company during the afternoon.  
(12) At 5:00 p.m. the English [16
th
 NF] attacked again in many waves in an attempt to 
capture the area on the right flank. A timely response with rifle and machine-gun fire 
prevented this. The Vorfeldzonelinie was again secure. Forty-six prisoners and 14 
machine-guns were captured. Regimental losses in killed and wounded were 11 officers 
and 200 men. The men of 5
th
 Company stood sadly before a stretcher on which was 
placed the body of their beloved Leutnant Junge, who had led them through many 
successful battles. 
 
 
(13) On 3 December the Heersbericht [Army Bulletin] reported the fighting of 1/2 
December: “Early yesterday, after violent drumfire during a moonlight night, the English 
with strong forces attacked our positions at and north of Passchendaele. Thüringian and 
Hessian troops threw back the enemy in a sharp counter-attack and made 60 prisoners”.  
 
 
(14) On 11 December the commander of the III Battalion invited the companies to the 
Kirchplatz for a ceremony where they would be honoured for their bravery during the 
fighting on 2 December. The Divisional Commander [General-Leutnant Schultheis] 
awarded Iron Crosses. He thanked them with a very short address and congratulated the 
Regiment for its energy, strength and well-executed defence, where many English were 
killed and taken prisoner. He added that the enemy did not get what they wished to 
capture; Höhenrücken – Passendale [and] Westroosebeke still remained in our hands. All 
did their duty during this engagement.  
 
 
(15) The Flanders Army was honoured by a visit from the Emperor following the end of 
the great battle (23 December). 50 select members of 38
th
Divison (under the command of 
Major von Pfannenberg) were awarded the Iron Cross II class at a ceremony attended by 
the All Highest. 
 
 
 
E 
 
Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 95: The Fight in Flanders, winter 1917 
44
 
 
15 November to 19 December 1917 
 
(1) The 38
th
 Division was placed in Fourth Army reserve in Flanders. On 10 November 
orders were changed and it was designated as an Eingreifdivision attached to Gruppe 
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 Major A.D. Buttmann, Kriegsgeschichte des Koninglich Preusischen 6. Thüringishen Infanterie 
Regiment Nr. 95: 1914-1918 (Zeulenroda, Thüringen: Verlag Bernhard Sporn, 1935). This translated 
section will, for narrative purposes, cover the period November 1917 to early February 1918.  
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Staden thus relieving 27
th
 [Württemburg] Division. Front commanders immediately 
proceeded to Gits, and from there to Hazewind where they joined Grenadier Regiment 
Nr. 123 in Eingreif Gruppe B of Division 3. The 38
th
 Division would remain attached to 
Gruppe Staden throughout the great Flanders battle. Special weapons were also issued 
during this time. 
 
 
 
                                Thüringian soldiers at the 38
th
 Division recruit depot March 1917  
                                                              (Source: Author’s Collection) 
 
(2) The Regiment was in the rear of the Houthulst Forest – once a preserve of the King of 
the Belgians – now reduced to a sea of shell holes and mud. In addition, enormous fallen 
trees prevented movement. The Regiment would become familiar with this chaos of 
which there was more to come. 
 
 
(3) Divisional relief began on 23 November. The exchange was complete by the twenty-
fourth. The enemy, as always during reliefs, became very nervous and the Army Group 
expected a night attack. It was believed that the English would attempt a handstreich 
[raid] in an attempt to win a better position on drier ground. Companies were notified that 
the relief would be delayed, although nothing occurred during the evening. The Tommies 
calmed themselves down, but south, near Westroosebeke, there appeared to be a great 
deal of fighting. The relief was not complete until 25 November. 
 
  
(4) It was believed that the Division would be given some rest, but there was to be 
disappointment. It next relieved 4
th
 Division and became an Eingreifdivision attached to 
Abschnitt B of Gruppe Staden (Garde Reserve Korps). The first thing the Battalion did 
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was identify quarters in nearby towns; I Battalion went to Bevern, II Battalion to Ardone 
and III Battalion to Ardeppelhoek.  
 
(5) Immediately the Regiment was situated it began preparations for the expected battle, 
but Tommy didn‟t come and the march was cancelled. The Regiment remained on alert 
and later the order came from [83
rd 
Infanterie-] brigade for relief. No one, however, 
believed this, although everyone was in desperate need of rest. Constant wet and the bad 
positions [bivouacs] under open sky made the men sick. Swelling of the feet from 
dampness caused great suffering. The English suffered more from constant wet feet, 
because they wore laced boots and Gamaschen [puttees], which were unsuitable for the 
Flanders mud. The German issue [jack-] boot was much better in the prevailing 
conditions. 
 
 
(6) On 30 November orders were given for the relief of the line between Passchendaele 
and Westroosebeke. On 1 December, the changeover with IR357 was completed. The 
much fought over Feldherrnhügel [General‟s Hill] with the Nordhof [Void Farm] on the 
left wing, was the position of the Regiment. The battle area was the typical Flanders 
landscape, with many bushes and rows of trees and bullet-riddled farmhouses. This area 
went as far as the Hauptwiderstandslinie situated on a high ridge and offering good 
observation. Mud separated the opposing lines below the slope. The enemy had a difficult 
time in this inundated area and therefore would attempt to capture the heights. The 
English desire to reach the higher ground was demonstrated by the fact that they fired 
every calibre they had, in order to wear down the Regiment before their next attack.  
 
 
(7) There was a light covering of snow on the landscape with a full moon lighting up the 
night sky, so one had to be careful. At around 11:00 p.m. on the evening of 1 December, 
not long after the Regiment made itself comfortable in the [new] position, the commander 
of 7
th
 Company discovered approximately 30 to 40 English in front of the 
Vorfeldzonelinie. These were believed to be ration carriers who had lost their way and 
were immediately shot down. 
 
 
(8) At 2:15 a.m. on 2 December, a strong twenty-man patrol was sighted in front of the 
Vorfeldzonelinie and easily dispersed. Suddenly, in the moonlight, an unbroken line of 
the enemy was discovered approaching the Feldherrnhügel. Shortly before 3:00 a.m. the 
enemy advanced through the deep mud. Abruptly, artillery fire, approaching the level of   
drumfire, bombarded the [divisional] hinterland where all of the light and heavy guns 
were located. Now there was work with heavy firing by our artillery, which hailed down 
shells on the enemy. The full moon gave our gunners the advantage because they could 
view rows and rows of the enemy and inflict many casualties. Despite all, the tough 
English came forward approximately 20 metres and threw themselves to the ground.  
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(9) The Regiment now experienced heavy grenade volleys that accounted for many 
machine- gunners, and supported by heavy artillery fire, the enemy advanced forward to 
breach the line. The brave defenders were unperturbed. In close fighting with their 
companions of the 6
th
 and 7
th
 companies, they continued resistance at the exhortation of 
their officers – Leutnants’ d.R. Rossger, Dollinger, Vzfw. Scheler and Vzfw. Hess. Despite 
heavy losses [to the Regiment], no ground was lost. In front of the small Abschnitt of 7
th
 
Company, 90 to 100 dead were counted and the English had to retreat. The enemy on the 
right wing had an easier avenue of retreat due to drier ground conditions.  
 
 
(10) On the right wing, the English approached the front of outpost line 4. The 8
th
 
Company fought hard – Leutnant d.R. Linck bleeding to death from wounds. A small 
group resisted from front and rear of the Vorfeldzonelinie and killed many of the enemy 
with light machine-gun fire. They [defenders] were eventually able to reach the safe area 
[behind]. 
 
 
(11) On the left wing, the English broke through to the Hauptwiderstandslinie and there 
they were very secure. On this spot heavy fighting occurred with bayonets and hand 
grenades. The enemy was too strong for the small, leaderless groups and it appeared they 
would conquer. At the last moment, Leutnant d.R. Rossger realised the danger and 
gathered 15 soldiers armed with machine-guns. He delegated command to Vzfw. Scheler 
and Vzfw. Hess and threw himself and the 15 men against the storming Tommies. 
Feldwebel-Leutnant Frobe
45
 (Commander of 5
th
 Company) also realised the situation, and 
joined the fray with his best men. The fight was man against man and the enemy was 
stopped. Not a foot of ground was lost; the gap was closed and combat came to a 
standstill. In the middle of the captured line was a position occupied by three brave men 
of IR95, who prevented the enemy from approaching. These were Leutnant d. R. Vogt, 
Gefreiter Fiestner and Gefrieter Landwehrmann.  
 
 
(12) Oberstleutnant von Selle (HQ in Westroosebeke) realised the critical situation at the 
Feldherrnhügel. At 8:30 a.m. he ordered Leutnant d.R. Martini – the most senior officer 
present – to attack from the left wing near the Nordhof, in order to push back the enemy 
breakthrough. The order was extremely difficult to execute because the enemy could spot 
any movement in the daylight. The task [approach] was only accomplished by having 
men crawl forward a few at a time. Martini, although delayed until the afternoon, was 
able to achieve this deployment. The enemy, unwilling to surrender his gains, proceeded 
to strengthen the newly captured positions.  
 
 
(13) The enemy could redeem past failures if he captured the Höhenrücken of the 
Feldherrnhügel. Yes. If it wasn‟t for the damned Germans – the Huns; they forgot that 
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 Feldwebel-Leutnant (Sergeant-Lieutenant) was a wartime rank culled from prior NCO‟s (generally 
retired, but if active with at least six years service) who were deemed to have the qualifications to fulfill a 
Lieutenant‟s rank, but without the qualifications to actually be promoted to Lieutenant.  
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we fight for the safety of our home and country. At 3:00 in the afternoon, Leutnant d.R. 
Martini, with Leutnant d.R. Klopple and 12
th
 Company, counter-attacked the enemy. Step 
by step, with heavy hand grenade fighting, they slowly but surely, as planned, won 
[secured] the flank.  
(14) The [main] counter-attack began in broad daylight at 5:15 p.m. when 11
th
 and 12
th
 
companies with two Truppes of 9
th
 Company attacked the enemy. At the same time, 
annihilation fire was called for and placed on the right positions. The Tommies resisted 
heavily at first. As the counter-attack continued they realised no further headway could 
be made and retreated with heavy loss. Leutnant d.R. Vogt and his two companions [still 
holding out in the Hauptwiderstandslinie] were liberated as the enemy fell back.  
 
 
(15) The English gained not an inch of ground. They were thrown back to their position 
in the sumpf [mud]. The commanding heights remained in our hands. On the bodies of 
the English dead were discovered maps that revealed the enemy had attacked with five 
battalions; very few of these poor souls returned.  In the Vorfeldzone lay hundreds of 
English dead. Our losses, however, were not few, but, thank God, more were wounded 
than dead. Captured booty consisted of 14 prisoners and eight Lewis Guns. On 2 
December 1917 the Regiment again demonstrated, despite a lack of rest for months, great 
heroism. Through all this fighting it maintained its reputation with the high command.  
 
 
(16) Through captured maps it was discovered that it was highly important for the 
English to reach the commanding heights in order to overlook the U-boat bases in the 
Brugge basin. The eastern slopes of the Feldherrnhügel protected the entire light and 
heavy artillery. It would have been a tremendous victory had the English succeeded. Such 
a success may have led to an early ending to the war. The II Battalion, which suffered the 
most losses and had endured the most fighting, was withdrawn into reserve that night   
and replaced by I Battalion. The enemy only concentrated on [the discharge of] artillery 
and machine-gun barrages.  
 
 
(17) At 3:00 a.m. on 5 December, the regimental Gefechtstand received a direct hit and 
Obersleutnant von Selle was wounded, although he remained with his men. The 
Regiment was very much in need of rest. With subdued joy, the men received news of 
[imminent] relief. The regiment was relieved by IR91 on the night of 7/8 December. The 
I Battalion went to Bevern, II Battalion to Ardone and III Battalion to Ardepplehoek. 
They next proceeded to Roulers Nord where they were quartered. The peace was short-
lived. On the night of 12/13 December, they returned to the hard-fought Feldherrnhügel 
of 2 December. The troops were transported by light railway to Most. The Flanders battle 
seemed to be over. Fighting became less and less every day. Tommy, with masses of men 
and material, had gained nothing to speak of. 
 
 
(18) On the night of 17/18 December, Unteroffizier Tappe and Gefreiter Glaser of 4
th
  
Company, each took four men of 1
st
 and 2
nd
 companies, and on their own initiative, led a 
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patrol to take out and capture prisoners from an enemy post known as „Engländernest‟. 
The post was found, to their surprise, to be unoccupied. As they proceeded further, there 
was no sign of the enemy. Leaving the mud, they reached the road about 500 metres from 
the Vorfeldlinie. This discovery led to the advance and consolidation of the area. On 18 
December an Englishman came forward [to surrender]. His feet were black and swollen. 
He had trench foot like most of the Tommies who were constantly walking and standing 
in water.  
 
 
The Days at Oostkamp 
 
(19) The Regiment was relieved on 18/19 December. It proceeded to Oostkamp near 
Brugge, where the Christmas holiday was celebrated. The highlight of this period was a 
visit by the Emperor, who wanted to celebrate the holiday with his Regiment in the field. 
Celebrations and church services took place with the Duke in attendance. Training 
commenced at the end of the festive season. Another brigade relieved the Regiment [at 
Oostkamp] on 18 January 1918.  
 
                                
Trench War in Flanders, Winter 1917-1918 
 
(20) The Regiment returned to Houthulst Forest, where it relieved IR148. The area was 
pleasantly familiar and it was an easy adjustment to dirt and mud after time spent at 
Oostkamp. Transported by light railway, the Regiment was quickly in Gits, and from 
there marched forward by foot. The weather was rainy and foggy. The front, however, 
became livelier as the weather improved. Fog remained until the afternoon, making it 
difficult and at the same time advantageous, for patrol work. The men mulled about in the 
Vorfeldzone looking to salvage things Tommy left behind.  
 
 
(21) On 31 January, Mus[ketier] Boss, while moving about the Vorfeldzone, lost his way 
in the fog and found himself in front of an enemy post. He discerned this after 
overhearing loud talking by the Tommies. Boss returned for assistance to capture these 
English. Halfway back he encountered Leutnant Vogt, who was already aware of the 
situation and had decided to rush the post. He then returned with Vzfw. Gunsch and a few 
others. In no time they had nine Tommies, 1 heavy machine-gun, 1 Lewis gun, 13 
ammunition boxes, tool chest, a few carbines and Karten [maps and charts]. This very 
small group returned, despite heavy enemy fire, at 2:00 p.m. with all their treasures to 
much applause from their comrades. Three NCOs and six men of 16
th
 Northumberland 
Fusiliers
46
 (96
th
 Brigade, 32
nd
 Division}, which had relieved 2
nd
 Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers of the same brigade, were made prisoner. For this feat, Vzfw. Gunsch and Mus. 
Boss were celebrated with speeches and awarded the Iron Cross 1
st
 Class.  
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th
 NF‟s last engagement before being disbanded as a result of BEF 
reorganisation in February 1918. See Captain C.H. Cooke, Historical Records of the 16
th
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(22) Everything remained quiet and clear. Oberstleutnant von Selle came forward with a 
light machine-gun [crew] and observed the unusual sight of one joyful, carefree man 
jumping over and across shell holes from the direction of the enemy line. At 300 yards 
the machine-gunners prepared to open fire, but the Oberstleutnant stopped them. It was a 
hot and happy Mus. Boss, who explained to his regimental commander that he wanted to 
go and get something to eat from Tommy: “Would you believe those fellows sleep at 
lunch? Here are corned beef, cakes, shaver and soap”. The regimental commander 
proceeded to reprimand Boss for his irresponsible behavior, despite his recent medal and 
previous achievements. Later, with great pride, he promoted Boss to Unteroffizier for 
bravery in the face of the enemy. Boss promised to be more responsible in the future. A 
few days later, however, he did something similar on another patrol… The Regiment was 
relieved by IR357 in early February; this was the same unit relieved during the previous 
December.  
 
 
 
F 
 
Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 96 
47
 
 
11 November to 17 December 1917 
 
(1) The English were successful in their attacks between Langemarck and Hollebeke. 
Eighty-six [German] divisions were sent to the front during this fighting. Thanks to these 
[formations] the English were unable to reach the Flanders plain.  
 
 
(2) The English, however, still hoped for a breakthrough by launching partial attacks. Our 
front positions suffered greatly from destructive fire. Eingreifdivisionen had difficulty in 
reaching the forward area; a change of tactics was necessary. A Vorfeldzone of 500 to 
1,000 metres was established in front of the Hauptwiderstandslinie, which would be 
occupied by a thin line of machine-gun outposts. The Vorfeldzonelinie was to retire to the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie during a large-scale attack. This gave Vorfeldkampfers enough 
time to await the arrival of the Eingreifdivisionen, which would then move forward. The 
scheme allowed for defensive elasticity against any attack.  
 
 
(3) Constant rain caused difficulties for the German defenders. Trenches and concrete 
shelters failed to provide refuge from the wet due to the high water table. The whole area 
was a complete field of mud. Men were hungry, frozen and had no cover from artillery 
fire. This was the condition of IR96 when it arrived at Deerlyk and St Louis. After re-
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organisation a new order arrived stating that the [38
th
] Division would be transferred from 
Gruppe Wytschaete to the newly formed Gruppe Staden.  
 
 
(4) 11 November found the battalions standing ready to be entrained from Swevegn. The 
train passed through Courtrai and Roulers to Gits. On arrival, there were no [destination] 
orders and the troops just stood about. Information was finally received directing the 
Regiment to proceed to quarters at Lichtervelde. On reaching this destination, however, 
there was no room because units already billeted there took up all available space. The 
decision was finally made that space would be shared with IR120. On 12 November 
further room had to be found after the arrival of III Battalion. 
 
 
(5) The Regiment was in Abschnitt 3 of Gruppe Staden. Deployed in this sector were 41
st
 
Division (Stellung Division) and 38
th
 Division (Eingreifdivision). IR94 and IR95 were 
quartered in Gits. The Division had to remain in constant readiness, therefore much 
needed machine-gun training was provided for the Ersatzleute [replacements]. Days were 
spent this way until 16 November when the order arrived to relieve IR18. II Battalion was 
to be Bereitschafts [BTK] Battalion; I and III battalions were designated forward and 
reserve battalions respectively. The Regiment then proceeded to the Houthulst Forest. 
After a quiet time, it received orders that it would be relieved by IR18 on 24 November. 
The relief was complete by the following day. On 26 November an unexpected phone 
call was received ordering 38
th
 Division to move. It was again designated Eingreifdivision 
and would be deployed on the left wing of Gruppe Staden to replace 4
th
 Division. On 
arrival in Wynendaele billets were limited and unacceptable. Necessary arrangements 
were arranged after long discussions with the Town Major, for additional quarters to be 
provided in Roulers for the regimental staff. The regiment now experienced some order 
and peace, but it had to remain in readiness to return to Gruppe Staden. Arrangements 
were made with IR14 (4
th
 Division) for a changeover every six days. 
 
 
(6) On 30 November, 38
th
 Division relieved 199
th
 Reserve Division in Abschnitt B. It 
would remain there for six days. IR96 replaced IR114 SW of Westroosebeke. A small 
area was found on the commanding heights for the BTK and the KTK. SW of this spot 
stretched the large valley of the battle sector as far as the Paddebeek. This depression was 
very muddy and untraversable in some areas. In the middle was a strip of land that 
offered a firm footing southward as far as the Paddebeek. Organisation of the divisional 
sector was constrained by bad terrain conditions and the limited number of concrete 
shelters. Companies were echeloned in depth. In front was A Company, behind B, C and 
finally D.  
 
 
(7) A wide Abschnittsbesetssung [occupied sector] of the firing line did not exist. 
Connection on the right was missing, while on the left there was at least eye contact. Mud 
prevented any large attacks from occurring, so companies were not placed in the line at 
full strength and often consisted of a Kampfkompagnie of 25 to 30 men and a 
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Bereitschafts Kompagnie of 30 to 40 men. It was so quiet that companies relieved 
themselves within the Battalion. The days spent in the line only drew heavy artillery fire. 
The Regiment experienced no infantry attack, but frontline machine-gunners were often 
called upon to assist neighbouring sectors. 
(8) On 4 December officers and Einweisungs Kommandos [liaison party] of IR15 (2
nd
 
Garde Reserve Division) introduced themselves. The Garde Reserve Division was to 
replace the 38
th
. First elements of IR15 arrived to relieve the Regiment during the evening 
of 6 December. I and III battalions were relieved first; II Battalion followed twenty-four 
hours later. Battalions went to Gitsberg, Koolskamp and Eegem. The Regiment remained 
at these villages for six days after which it returned to the same sector, but not the same 
portion of the line. Instead it would be inserted into the more dangerous Abschnitt B on 
the left.  
 
 
(9) On the night of 12/13 December IR96 relieved IR77. On the thirteenth, Major Behrens 
took over command of the Regiment because Oberstleutnant von Hertell was due to 
proceed on leave. The left of Abschnitt B was the most dangerous portion of the 
divisional front, as it belonged to the half-circle around Passchendaele. Companies were 
distributed as follows: 9
th
 Company to the Vorfeldzonelinie, 10
th
, 11
th
 and 12
th
 to the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie. The KTK established its main fighting position in the right 
battalion‟s sector by Nordhof. The Regiment was relieved, following a quiet time in the 
frontline, on 17 December.  
 
 
 
German map overlay: Vicinity of Passchendaele and Vat Cottage Ridge (Source: MMP) 
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                 Appendix 17          
 
                Casualties: KIA & DOW 
                  30 November-10 December 191748 
 
25 Brigade (8
th
 Division) 
 
2
nd
 Royal Berkshire 
 
Surname Initial Service No. Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment 
ALLEN JJ 11579 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
ASHLEY AV 38488 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BACKWAY AP 38489 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BARLOW J 26065 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BEST FW 38499 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BIRD WG 15759 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BISHOP WE 14474 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BURT H 31408 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
CHILDS CH 7873 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
COATES F 27301 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
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  73 
REGIMENT 
COGGS HJ 21800 
C COY 2ND 
BN  
02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
COLLINS F 11670 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
DICKER C 18732 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
DOLLIN HJ 38521 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
FISHER EE 38531 
B COY 2ND 
BN  
02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
FITZGERALD N 38214 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
GADSBY D 38533 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
GERAGHTY T 38270 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
GIDDINGS F 2ND LT 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HARWOOD TJ 38547 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HAYWARD GH 9782 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HEWETT S 16426 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HILL EA 32863 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HOLMAN GA 38552 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HOWARTH H 37012 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
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JENKINS H 37850 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
KING HE 17843 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
KING AS 38557 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
KIRKLAND TM 37058 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
KNIGHT S 36373 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
KNOTT F 17129 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
LOCKE N 38274 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
LUCAS T 37862 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
LUFF SC 39414 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
LUING FJ 28821 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
PAGET AW 37552 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
RAY CE 38281 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
RUDKIN EH 37867 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
RUMBLE JW 7743 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
SIMPSON R 38597 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
TAYLOR F 36797 2ND BN  02/12/1917 ROYAL 
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BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
TROUP SH LT 
7TH BN 
ATTD 2ND 
BN  
02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
TRUCKLE TF 38269 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
WAIT HAV LT 
D COY 2ND 
BN  
02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
WAKELY FJ 38243 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
WEBB SE 15744 
D COY 2ND 
BN  
02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
WHITE CA 38626 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
WOOD HFC 33056 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
WOOD H 37483 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
 
Total: 3 officers and 46 ORs 
 
 
2
nd
 Lincolnshire Regiment 
 
Surname Initi
als 
Service 
No. 
Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment 
AIREY A 32990 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
ALLSOP GF 38012 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BAGWORTH H 203894 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BAKER JJ 40069 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BARRAN M 202224 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BARROW J 32867 2ND BN  02/12/1917 LINCOLNSHIRE 
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REGIMENT 
BARTLE GS 1507 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BILLING TW 38049 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BLACKBOURN W 40708 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BOOTH W 38456 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BRADLEY J 18641 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BRAMMER W 18533 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
BRICE FW 13327 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
CARTER E 18955 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
CHEESEMAN WC 265052 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
CLARK H 18337 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
COGGAN HW 21357 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
COOPER TH 12234 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
COWLIN JL 8745 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
COWE A CAPT 
ATTD 2ND BN 
LINCOLNSHIR
E REGT 
02/12/1917 RAMC 
CROSSLEY CI 40380 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
CULLUM AH 24985 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
CURTIS A 31711 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
DICKINSON HJ 1544 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
DONNER JW 
R3/2505
9 
2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
DOYLEY F 22585 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
EDWARDS W 40242 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
FENWICK TE 31932 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
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FENWICK E 22917 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
FULLER JH 8261 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
GLAZZARD WT 32832 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
GRAY JH 16279 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
GRIFFIN BW 2ND LT 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HALFORD SH 40188 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HARBY WB 27025 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HARRISON R 38075 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HICKSON E 41608 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
HOLMES A 40086 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
KIME A 203889 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
LEATHERLAND J 8357 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
LEES CE 40582 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
NICHOLLS CR 8583 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
ODLING FS 27699 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
PARKER RH LT 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
PEARSON G 13658 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
PEART A 41548 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
PICARD H 7755 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
SENTANCE JA 22781 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
SMITH FR 31272 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
WALKER RH 20901 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
WILLSON A 8471 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
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WRIGHT WJ 203881 2ND BN  02/12/1917     
LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
 
Total: 3 officers and 49 ORs 
 
 
2
nd
 Rifle Brigade 
 
Surname Initials Service No. Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment 
BARNARD HF S/6701 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
BINGHAM G 6201 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
BLYTH ES S/9473 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
BOTTOMLEY T S/28926 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
BROADLEY J S/30853 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
BROOKER J 2ND LT 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
CARR J S/12735 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
COCKS H S/31983 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
COOPER JH S/19172 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
CRACK J S/29695 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
DAVIES TCT S/9620 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
DAY WP S/31377 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
DUDINSKY J S/32173 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
DUNNAGE W B/200434 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
EASEY AE B/200922 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
ELLIOTT FR S/26606 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
GRIMES W S/26825 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
HORNE E S/10498 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
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JACKSON E S/18125 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
JEFFERY FE S/32157 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
JOYCE E B/1136 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
KESTER S S/32299 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
LESTER WT S/33758 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
MACHIN J Z/2193 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
MITCHLEY HC 2978 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
MOORE A B/1524 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
MORLEY HA S/27831 
C COY 2ND 
BN  
01/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
MORRISON W 2ND LT 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
NORMAN RJ S/23516 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
PHILLIPS WC S/10504 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
POYNER A S/11052 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
PRYSE JW S/24279 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
RATLIFF EF CAPT 
6TH BN 
ATTD 2ND 
BN  
02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
ROWE JH S/17413 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
RULE AE B/200612 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
RUSHBROOK A P/935 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
RUSSELL C 5426 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
SCRUTTON HC S/32427 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
STOTEN HW S/18211 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
TOWNSHEND JS 9861 2ND BN  01/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
WASS JA S/4377 2ND BN  02/12/1917 RIFLE 
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BRIGADE 
WEBLEY FJK S/25854 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
WOOD GA B/200900 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
WYATT J S/28568 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
RIFLE 
BRIGADE 
 
Total 3 officers and 41 ORs 
 
 
1
st
 Royal Irish Rifles 
 
Surname Initials Service No. Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment 
ADAMS JW 9554 1ST BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
BOULTON D 47410 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
COBB G 47422 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
CONDRON M 3956 1ST BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
CONNOLLY T 11377 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
CONROY W 9074 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
DAY J 5228 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
DUNN H 7712 1ST BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
GILLIGAN J 10664 1ST BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
GILMORE P 9168 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
GLOVER J 47300 1ST BN  30/11/1917 ROYAL 
  81 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
GOUGH CFG 43844 1ST BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
GREEN S 10646 1ST BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
HAWKINS A 47421 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
HERKES J 47430 1ST BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
HICKEY J 4253 1ST BN  02/12/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
KAYE E L/7355 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
LENNARD EW 2ND LT 
4TH BN 
ATTD 1ST 
BN  
30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
MCLOUGHLIN T 5675 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
PARRY RW 42426 
C COY 1ST 
BN  
30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
PEPLOE W 42423 1ST BN  01/12/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
PITTMAN EJ 43958 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
WILKIE AB 2ND
 
LT 1ST BN  30/11/1917 
ROYAL 
IRISH 
RIFLES 
 
Total: 23 ORs 
 
 
 
 
 
  82 
97 Brigade (32
nd
 Division) 
 
2
nd
 KOYLI 
 
Surname Initials Service 
No. 
Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment 
ASQUITH GW 2ND LT 
3RD BN 
ATTD 
2ND BN 
02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
ABBISS RD 2ND LT 
3RD BN 
ATTD 
2ND BN  
02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
ANDERTON WT 42043 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
ARMITAGE JT 33018 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BAILEY A 20356 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BAKER H 241927 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BEDFORD WH 21334 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BERRY S 34379 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
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CAIN E 2ND LT 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CAWDERY J 10142 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CHALLONER A 241716 
2ND/5TH 
BN  
03/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CHAPPLE E 200920 
2ND/4TH 
BN  
01/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CONNERTY D 241515 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
COOKSEY
49
 A 9280 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CORCORAN AT 2ND LT 
3RD BN 
ATTD 
2ND BN  
02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
COURCOUX JH 42342 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
COX H 12777 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
                                                 
49
 Great uncle of Jon Cooksey (current editor of the Western Front Association‟s quarterly journal). See 
„Editor‟s Introduction‟, „Stand To! No. 81, December 2007-January 2008.  
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INFANTRY 
DAY JR 235231 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
DEAKIN JE 11053 
A COY 
2ND BN  
02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
ELLIS JN 2ND LT 
3RD BN, 
ATTD 
2ND BN  
01/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
FORDE HR CAPT 
D COY 
2ND BN  
02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
FORREST W 35797 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
FORREST R 8505 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
FURNISS WT 45249 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
GIBBONS W 240874 
2ND/5TH 
BN  
01/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
HAIGH H 33423 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
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HANSON W 29973 2ND BN  03/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
HEYWORTH F 35708 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
HUTCHINSON E 241895 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
KAYE R 30941 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
LAKE T 23052 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MARSHALL E 205025 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MATTHEWS F 25064 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MAY TA 14295 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCKEE WA 23308 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MOLLOY E 32700 2ND BN  01/12/1917 KING'S 
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OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
NAREY J 201957 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
NEILANS TR 24688 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
OSBORNE E 34815 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
OWEN WE 24560 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
PATTERSON EJ 235309 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
PATTISON AE 202009 2ND BN  03/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
PERRY AS 235294 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
POOLE H 200435 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
RAYNE H 22852 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
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YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
REANEY J 28244 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
RUSHWORTH A 30928 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SHUFFLEBOTHAM W 202474 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SIMMONETT WH 30972 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SMITH A 41278 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
STEVENSON GT 3/3616 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
TURNER C 235315 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
VASEY A 42204 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WAGSTAFF J 30256 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
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LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WALLACE AE 23055 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WATSON W 15386 2ND BN  03/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WEBB F 9570 
H COY 
2ND BN  
02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WHOMERSLEY H 35757 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WYATT F 24653 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
YATES G 20883 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
YERWORTH GH 40022 2ND BN  02/12/1917 
KING'S 
OWN 
YORKSHIRE 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
Total: 6 officers and 54 ORs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  89 
16
th
 HLI 
Surname Initials Service 
No. 
Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment 
ALEXANDER J CAPT C COY 
16TH BN  
02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BARNSHAW GH 39166 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BARRIE J 27631 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BELL DSD 32453 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BENNIE WR 2ND 
LT 
7TH BN 
ATTD 
16TH BN  
02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BROWN T 42221 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BURNS A 3375 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BURT WJ 43078 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CAIRNS H 350220 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CAMPBELL W 43110 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CANNING J 25924 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CHUDLEY HJ 350181 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CLEWLOW H 350154 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CONNELL J 4979 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
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CRUICKSHANK D 42223 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
DALLAS WA 355403 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
DAVIDSON GL CAPT 4TH BN 
ATTD 
16TH BN  
02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
EDGAR W 3471 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
FERRIS J 2ND LT 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
FORBES W 14157 C COY 
16TH BN  
02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
FORBES J 1390 C COY 
16TH BN  
02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
FRASER J 34728 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
GILLESPIE AM 26362 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
GRANT JR 14165 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
HALLIDAY F 12849 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
HART H 31719 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
HATCHER W 29418 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
HEPBURN R 39185 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
JOHNSON WJ 350179 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
KYNOCH J 355414 16TH BN  01/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
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LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
LEES J 15002 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MARR J 33395 A COY 
16TH BN  
03/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MARSHALL A 355591 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MARTIN PW 39147 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCCARDLE J 31009 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCDOUGALL D 13909 D COY 
16TH BN  
03/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCDOWALL J 39199 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCGUIRE J 30687 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCINNES RS 37881 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCMILLAN DE 42323 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCVEY W 32301 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MITCHELL C 355456 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MITCHELL J 355594 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
PARENT J 40757 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
PATTON ES 43068 16TH BN  03/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
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INFANTRY 
PLUMB S 350224 C COY 
16TH BN  
02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
RATTRAY R 34119 C COY 
16TH BN  
02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
ROBERTSON J 350202 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
RUSSELL TL 25779 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SCOTT A 33371 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SEMPLE JH 37854 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SHARP JM 355602 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SMALL J 39191 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SMITH R 30359 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
THOMSON R 40073 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
THOMSON LB 40912 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
THOMSON A 29962 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
TILEY AF 4310 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
TULLOCH A 35663 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WALLACE R 43011 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
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WENZEL J 30121 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WESTGARTH FW 41151 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WHITFIELD J 2ND  
LT 
16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WOODWARD AA 356355 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WORLING D 14974 16TH BN  02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
Total: 5 officers and 60 ORs  
 
 
 
11
th
 Border Regiment 
 
Surname Initials Service 
No. 
Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment 
ANDERSON R 13705 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
ASHCROFT J 26005 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
ASHMAN FW 28817 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BAILEY CE 28814 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BAINBRIDGE P 13680 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BAINBRIDGE E 202684 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BAKER WR 28818 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BARNES H 32001 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BARTON J 28916 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BENSON I CAPT 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BICKLEY AG 28825 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
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BLAYLOCK JJ 26291 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BOTTOM WB 28771 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BRAMBLE CJ 28636 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BRIDGE RJ 27670 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BROADHURST L 34511 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BROUGH TM 202879 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BROWN B 28923 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BROWN GW 241761 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BURGESS J 28765 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
BURGESS EJ 25119 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
CADDLE T 25588 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
CARMICHAEL JR 260212 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
CRAKER SE 33708 A COY 
11TH BN  
02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
DALBY JW 260219 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
DALTON W 28928 11TH BN  03/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
DALZELL W 32643 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
DAVIDSON JJ 23777 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
DAVIDSON F 15372 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
DELAHOY GF 33344 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
DEMELLWEEK J 260216 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
DOBSON W 4296 D COY 
11TH BN  
03/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
DOUGLAS WJ 20963 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
EGGINTON H 33536 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
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FERNYHOUGH H 28623 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
FLETCHER WP 260221 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
FRANCIS HG 28274 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
GIBSON T 13902 B COY 
11TH BN  
02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
GRAHAM J 26902 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
GUNNING WF 263073 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HANSON JR 26480 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HARRIS W 25083 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HAYWARD J 33484 11TH BN  03/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HENDERSON J 23690 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HEPWOOD H 28940 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HEYWOOD F 33553 11TH BN  03/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HOBLEY AW 28847 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HODGSON J 12969 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HODGSON R 263076 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HOGG RT 13746 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HOWE W 32665 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HURLEY H 26564 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
HYAM J 28937 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
LAWS EE 33424 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
LOWES C 15396 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
MACDONALD D 17383 11TH BN  03/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
MACDUFF WB 2ND LT 5TH BN 
ATTD 
02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
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11TH
 
BN  
MARSH EA 28863 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
MARTIN PM CAPT 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
MAYALL H 28780 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
MENDHAM G 24764 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
MERRYWEATHER A 28953 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
MOORE RW 33754 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
MORAN J 26613 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
MULLARD W 28629 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
OLIPHANT T 28150 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
PARKIN G 17444 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
PARRY M 260254 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
PENNINGTON A 35043 A COY 
11TH BN  
02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
POLLITT E 11919 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
POWELL JT 27808 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
POYSER S 34247 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
RAVEN J 13373 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
RICHARDSON W 28152 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
RICHARDSON RC 2ND LT 3RD BN 
ATTD 
11TH BN  
02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
RIDGWAY WT 2ND LT 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
ROBSON F 19666 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
RYAN J 33401 A COY 
11TH BN  
02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
SAFFELL E 22160 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
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SANDEMAN AF CAPT 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
SCHOLES W 26929 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
SEEKINGS H 28215 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
SHORT L 8941 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
SMITH WD 32664 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
STEELE BIL 15553 11TH BN  03/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
STEWARD AS 28214 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
SWIFT G 33144 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
THORNE W 32467 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
TOLSON J 202891 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
TRUSLER W 32685 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
TYLDESLEY E 34514 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
TYSON W 13361 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
WALKER T 22015 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
WALKER C 30146 11TH BN  03/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
WATSON B 23985 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
WATT JW 17322 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
WHITE B 260263 11TH BN  03/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
WILSON JT 242087 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
WOOD EG 26292 11TH BN  02/12/1917 BORDER 
REGIMENT 
 
Total: 6 officers and 93 ORs 
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 17
th
 HLI 
 
Surname Initials Service No. Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment 
ANKER G 39161 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
ATKIN E 37983 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BAYNE E 41195 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BLACK J 355619 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
BOWMAN W 5690 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CAMERON M 2ND LT 
6TH BN 
ATTD 
17TH
 
BN  
02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CLEMENTS J 42196 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CLINES T 2064 17TH BN  01/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CLYNE JC 353102 17TH BN  01/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CONNELL W 29801 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CONNOR D 42987 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CONSTABLE J 2868 
D COY 
17TH BN  
02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CORMACK HS 3456 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CROSBIE D 42018 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
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CULLEN J 33796 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CUNNINGHAM G 42929 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
CUNNINGHAM PN 
2ND  
LT 
17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
DARGE JF 23055 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
DEUCHARS W 353104 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
DICK J 42302 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
GOOCH A 33429 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
GORDON J 45008 17TH BN  01/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
GREER W 42349 17TH BN  01/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
HANLEY J 8720 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
HUNTER R 43398 
B COY 
17TH BN  
02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
JAMIESON J 45004 17TH BN  01/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
KEIR AD 41167 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
KELT J 42988 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
KING A 23943 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
KINLOCH A 43328 A COY 02/12/1917 HIGHLAND 
  100 
17TH BN  LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
LAW WW 41215 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
LEARY O 42931 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
LUMSDEN H 40895 17TH BN  01/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MASON C 41242 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCEWAN A 39392 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCKELLAR A 27940 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCLELLAN J 42012 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCNEILL P 42921 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCPHEE C 42939 17TH BN  01/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MCWHIRTER W 42122 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MEARNS JM 356874 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MILLAR J 43375 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MILLER J 
2ND  
LT 
17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MILLIGAN RB 16146 
C COY 
17TH BN  
01/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
MORLAND W 
2ND  
LT 
17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
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INFANTRY 
OGILVIE JR 33662 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
OSBORNE J 
2ND  
LT 
17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
PHILIP DS 355173 
A COY 
17TH BN  
02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
RAMSAY JS 42373 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
REID RH 
2ND
 
LT 
3RD BN 
ATTD 
17TH BN 
02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
ROBERTSON DM 2685 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
ROBSON W 42979 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SCULLION R 41199 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SHENTON AW 41251 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SIMPSON T 42848 
D COY 
17TH BN  
02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
SPENCE EH 42128 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
THOMSON F 38529 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WALSH J 39516 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WILSON J 42205 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
WILSON A 202497 17TH BN  03/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
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WRIGHT A 38513 17TH BN  02/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
YOUNG J 32510 17TH BN  01/12/1917 
HIGHLAND 
LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
Total: 6 officers and 56 ORs   
 
15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers 
Surname Initials Service 
No. 
Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment 
ARRIES JM 235067 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
ASTIN W 47692 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
BODEN C 39804 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
BUCHAN C 2ND 
LT 
1ST BN 
ATTD 
15TH BN  
02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
CROPPER JA 201126 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
EARNSHAW W 305913 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
FARRINGTON JE 2983 C COY 
15TH BN  
02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
GOSLING GH 242824 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
GREEN J 39816 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
HINCHEY H 39659 15TH BN  01/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
HOLDEN J 20036 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
HOPWOOD H 27500 15TH BN  03/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
HOWARD J 202075 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
ISHERWOOD J 10199 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
LAYTHAM JH 39707 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
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MATHEWS S 32585 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
MONFRIES A 32559 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
NOEL TA 306729 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
ORMROD F 12575 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
OWEN JR 39611 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
PICKERING CR 38156 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
ROBINSON GT 47125 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
SCRIVENER JS 2ND LT 8TH BN 
ATTD 
15TH BN  
02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
SIMPSON J 40296 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
STEER EA 32581 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
TUSHINGHAM T 18162 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
WARBURTON C 6053 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
WOOSTER LE 235375 15TH BN  01/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
YATES J 38412 15TH BN  02/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
 
Total: 2 officers and 27 ORs 
 
 
16
th
 Northumberland Fusiliers 
 
Surname Initials Service 
No. 
Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment 
ATKINS E 235328 16TH BN  01/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
BELL R 16/1441 D COY 
16TH BN  
02/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
BREESE AG 36818 16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
CEILLAMS EG 52753 16TH BN  02/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
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COLE E 37049 16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
COLLINGS FR 2ND LT 
 
16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
DEVLIN T 24090 16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
ELLERKER WG 54445 16TH BN  30/11/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
FATHERLEY RT 16/732 16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
GRAINGER A 39752 16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
HOOD T 16/767 16TH BN  02/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
JACKSON J 34757 B COY 
16TH BN  
30/11/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
JAMES W 24041 16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
KIDD RF 37035 16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
LEYLAND T 235448 16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
LONG FA 40409 16TH BN  02/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
NEWHAM CT 36822 C COY 
16TH BN  
03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
NORMAN A 366171 16TH BN  02/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
OLDALE A 17512 16TH BN  02/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
PYLE GA 25/533 16TH BN  30/11/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
SHEARER JA 16/1043 16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
SMITH GB 31436 16TH BN  02/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
THOMPSON W 27/1268 16TH BN  03/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
WIGHT F 31912 16TH BN  30/11/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
 
Total: 1 officer and 22 ORs  
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KIA or DOW 4-10 December 
 
Surname Initials Service 
No. 
Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment  
DYKE WH 38524 2ND BN  05/12/1917 ROYAL BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
 
HODGSON GW 10359 2ND BN 
POW 
10/12/1917 ROYAL BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
 
ROGERS F 16308 2ND BN  04/12/1917 ROYAL BERKSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
 
CONNELL H 26499 2ND BN  07/12/1917 LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
 
GRANTHAM A 40212 2ND BN  05/12/1917 LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
 
HOPPS TJ 5510 2ND BN  05/12/1917 LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
 
TAYLOR JR 31917 2ND BN  04/12/1917 LINCOLNSHIRE 
REGIMENT 
 
DOVE WE S/4547 2ND BN  09/12/1917 RIFLE BRIGADE  
HIGGINBOTTOM P Z/738 2ND BN 
POW  
05/12/1917 RIFLE BRIGADE  
HOLLOWAY JH S/26623 2ND BN  06/12/1917 RIFLE BRIGADE  
MACE AE S/30798 2ND BN  09/12/1917 RIFLE BRIGADE  
SHEPHERD RWG S/10061 2ND BN 
POW  
07/12/1917 RIFLE BRIGADE  
DIXON J 241078 2ND BN  09/12/1917 KING'S OWN 
YORKSHIRE LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
SURR W 3/1141 2ND BN  10/12/1917 KING'S OWN 
YORKSHIRE LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
WILSON M 29334 2ND BN  04/12/1917 KING'S OWN 
YORKSHIRE LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
COUTTS AG 36546 D COY 
16TH 
BN  
06/12/1917 HIGHLAND LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
CROSS FA 39174 16TH 
BN  
06/12/1917 HIGHLAND LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
SMART EJ 350229 16TH 
BN  
04/12/1917 HIGHLAND LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
SMITH H 3426 16TH 
BN  
04/12/1917 HIGHLAND LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
BENT F 260268 11TH 
BN POW 
05/12/1917 BORDER REGIMENT  
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DENT J 202882 11TH 
BN  
04/12/1917 BORDER REGIMENT  
KEMP GH 28944 11TH 
BN  
07/12/1917 BORDER REGIMENT  
LOMAS J 28951 11TH 
BN  
09/12/1917 BORDER REGIMENT  
NEWTON TA 28956 B COY 
11TH 
BN  
08/12/1917 BORDER REGIMENT  
REED AJ 28869 11TH 
BN  
08/12/1917 BORDER REGIMENT  
FOSTER J 13550 B COY 
17TH 
BN  
09/12/1917 HIGHLAND LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
HALL AW 202272 17TH 
BN  
04/12/1917 HIGHLAND LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
MAIR AG 37916 17TH 
BN  
10/12/1917 HIGHLAND LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
MCFARLANE HR 42952 17TH 
BN  
04/12/1917 HIGHLAND LIGHT 
INFANTRY 
 
ARMSTRONG WE 38137 15TH 
BN  
10/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
 
BULLEN F 32533 15TH 
BN KIA 
05/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
 
RATCLIFFE C 11321 15TH 
BN  
07/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
 
WELLS WA 19733 D COY 
15TH 
BN  
05/12/1917 LANCASHIRE 
FUSILIERS 
 
BERESFORD AE 4670 16TH 
BN  
08/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
 
COATES WW 40166 16TH 
BN  
10/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
 
GRACE CE 52754 16TH 
BN  
09/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
 
LUSTGARTEN M 47083 16TH 
BN  
05/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
 
MURRAY JW 27/1145 16TH 
BN  
04/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
 
WALSH A 36828 16TH 
BN KIA 
06/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
 
WINDROSS C 41707 16TH 
BN  
05/12/1917 NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS 
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Total: 40 ORs 
 
RFA, RGA, MGC & RAMC 
 
Surname Initials Service 
No. 
Battalion Date of 
Death 
Regiment/Corps 
EDMONDSON N 116739 C BTY 161ST 
BDE  
02/12/1917 ROYAL FIELD 
ARTILLERY 
HEALER WE 152893 C BTY 161ST 
BDE  
02/12/1917 ROYAL FIELD 
ARTILLERY 
HEALER WE 152893 C BTY 161ST 
BDE  
02/12/1917 ROYAL FIELD 
ARTILLERY 
WRIGHT G 71569 109TH SIEGE 
BTY  
02/12/1917 ROYAL 
GARRISON 
ARTILLERY 
BANNISTER W 64822 14TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
BARTON W 7534 97TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
BAXTER R 103168 218TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
BENNETT JT 102782 218TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
BRAME EG 86798 218TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
BURDOCK AV 60306 96TH COY  03/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
BUTTERWORTH W 108564 96TH COY  03/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
CLAY F 103059 218TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
FIDLER S 73038 14TH COY  30/11/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
FOWLER J 97618 25TH COY  01/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
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GILROY T 60464 14TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
HOLDEN F 65345 96TH COY  03/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
JENKINS HH 68529 96TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
KING J 81885 218TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
KING J 67924 218TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
KNOX A 73022 14TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
MITCHELL G 8273 14TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
NEAL WG 7810 96TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
OSBORNE FC 81720 97TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
PEARCE W 89812 97TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
PEGRUM W 47675 25TH COY  01/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
POTTER JH 35931 96TH COY  03/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
PRICE WJ 67929 218TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
RANDALL HE 107569 219TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
ROCHE C 36383 14TH COY  03/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
ROTHWELL H 2ND 
LT 
14TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
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(INFANTRY) 
SMEATON H 64269 97TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
SMITH E 107564 214TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
SOUTAR W 7867 97TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
SUNDERLAND W 27001 97TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
SUTTON P 65294 97TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
TRIGG JC 107565 219TH COY  02/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
WALTON JR 106445 25TH COY  01/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
WILSON CW 53997 25TH COY  01/12/1917 MACHINE 
GUN CORPS 
(INFANTRY) 
BAKER WH 457506 25TH FIELD 
AMBULANCE  
02/12/1917 RAMC 
 
Total: 1 officer and 38 ORs 
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                                                              Appendix 18 
 
Official History Correspondence: General Cameron Shute 50 
 
 
   10
th
 December 1930 
 
My Dear Edmonds,  
 
I have read through all the papers you sent and I now return them. I made notes only in 
“Third Army 1st - 3rd April 1918”. As far as 32nd Division is concerned all that has been 
said is correct. Except for Ayette we had little to do.  
 
What I should like to have looked at are: 
 
(a) Action of 59th Brigade & 20th Div. when it captured Guillemont in Aug-Sept 16. 
 
(b) Action of R[oyal] Naval Div[ision] when I commanded it at the Battle of 
Beaumont Hamel & after – Oct 16 to February 17. 
 
(c) Action of 32nd Div. March-April 17 when I commanded it at the extreme British 
right before St Quentin.  
 
(d) Action of 19th Div. at Battle of Messines June 17 [,] where I was sent up to 
command it from a week before to 3 weeks after it.  
 
(e) Action of 32nd Div. July 17 to early 18 on the Yser – Very hard fighting.  
 
(f) Action of 32nd Div. at end of Passchendaele.  
 
(g) V Corps operations April 18 to November 11th 1918.  
 
All these are rather big shows.  
 
(4) As an appeal came with for any papers of interest [,] I am sending a return of 
casualties for 6 months which I had most carefully compiled day-by-day in 32
nd
 Div. The 
preparation [?] of wounds from art[ille]ry fire ??? ??? ??? rifle & MG fire make one 
think. I don‟t know of any similar return. Please don‟t lose it and return when done with 
it [,] as I have no copy.  
 
 Yours V[ery] Sincerely 
 
 Cameron Shute 
                                                 
50
 TNA: CAB/45/187 Postwar Official History Correspondence (Third Army 1918).  
  
 
 
 
Map 1 Stages of the Third Battle of Ypres 
(Source: Gilbert, British History Atlas) 
 
  
 
 
 
  Map 2 Second Battle of Passchendaele (Source: Edmonds, OH 1917 Vol. 2)
  
 
 
 
Map 3 Passchendaele Salient  
 (Source: Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Map 4 Second Army Objective Map: The area between ‘EXISTING LINE’ and ‘FORMING UP LINE’   
was to be secured in a preliminary operation (subsequently cancelled) scheduled for the night of 21/22 
November (Source: LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Map 5 Abstract: 8
th
 Division MG Barrage Scheme 
  (Source: TNA: WO/95/1677) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Map 6 8
th
 Division: Artillery Barrage Scheme 
(Source: TNA: WO/95/1677) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Map 7 32
nd
 Division: MG Barrage Scheme 
(Source: 32
nd
 Division MG Map (TNA: WO/95/2370) 
  
 
 
 
Map 8 32nd Division: Area Concentration Artillery Barrage Scheme (Source: TNA: WO/95/643)
  
 
 
 
 Map 9 8
th
 Division: Dispositions at Zero (Source: TNA: WO/95/1677) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                        Map 10 32
nd
 Division: Dispositions at Zero (Source: TNA: WO/95/2370) 
  
 
 
 
                                    Map 11 8
th
 Division: Dispositions at Dawn (Source: TNA: WO/95/1677) 
  
 
 
 
 Map 12 8
th 
Division: Ultimate Position Reached (Source: TNA: WO/95/1677) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                              Map 13 8
th
 Division: Situation Evening of 3 December (Source: WO/95/1677) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
       Map 14 32
nd
 Division: Situation Evening of 5 December (Source: TNA: WO/95/643) 
  
 
 
 
       Map 15 Annotated Google Earth image of Passchendaele north vicinity and Vat Cottage Ridge  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
       Map 16 Annotated Google Earth image of Westroosebeke and southern environs 
 
